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Abstract
The intersection of race, justice and politics create a vicious cycle in the U.S. Those most affected by
disparities in the current system are the least likely to participate in politics, while those relatively
unaffected are often unlikely to acknowledge the issue as one in need of political solutions. This
dissertation makes four contributions to this larger concern. First, using court data paired with
voting records, it provides further evidence that contact with the police decreases turnout. By
examining how the size of this effect varies based on characteristics of the individuals and their
experiences, it also sheds light on the potential mechanisms behind this effect. Second, it offers a
holistic framework for thinking about how dispositions, experience, and vicarious information shape
attitudes about the criminal justice system. Third, it applies this framework in the analysis of two
survey experiments demonstrating broadly that perceptions of injustice vary markedly by race
and specifically showing how people unlikely to experience discrimination personally are unlikely
to perceive bias in the specific interactions with the police, regardless of their beliefs about the
general fairness of the police. Finally, with survey data and a unique experiment, it shows that
vicarious exposure to minority experiences with the police may facilitate a common understanding
of the racial issues facing the criminal justice system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
On August 9th, 2014, Michael Brown, a black teenager, was shot and killed by Darren Wilson,
a white police officer, in Ferguson, MO. The events that led to Brown’s death are complicated.1
Video footage from earlier in the day showed Brown stealing cigarillos at a nearby convenience
store. Responding to the reported theft, Wilson stopped Brown and his friend on a nearby street.
At some point while Wilson was questioning the teens from his vehicle, an altercation occurred.
Witnesses told conflicting reports: Some claimed Brown punched Wilson. Others denied he was
ever in the car. Testifying later, Wilson claimed Brown reached for his gun. Two shoots were fired
while Wilson was in the car, one of which appears to have grazed Brown’s thumb. Brown then
ran, with Wilson pursuing him on foot. Then Brown stopped, turned around, and began to move
toward Wilson. Wilson fired, hitting Brown six times.
Brown’s death sparked weeks of protest, garnering national coverage and fueling a larger de-
bate about race and criminal justice in the U.S. The following March, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) released two reports. The first regarding the criminal investigation of Wilson’s actions and
Brown’s death essentailly upheld the grand jury’s decision not to indict Wislon, not withstanding
1See Larry Buchanan, Ford Fessenden, K.K. Rebecca Lai, Haeyoun Park, Alicia Parlapiano, Archie
Tse, Tim Wallace, Derek Watkins and Karen Yourish, “Q&A What Happened in Ferguson?” The New
York Times August 10, 2015, available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/
ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html
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the public outcry.2 The second report, conveyed findings from the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division
investigation into the broader practices of the Ferguson Police Department.3 This scathing report
details numerous examples of racial bias, constitutional violations, and the abuse and misuse of
authority. Rather than reducing crime, the report argues: “Ferguson’s law enforcement practices
are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs” (p. 2). Nearly a
quarter of the general fund revenues in 2015 came from fines and fees. An unkempt lawn might
warrant a $5 fine in some cities. In Ferguson, it cost $102. The impact of this policing strategy
disproportionately effected the city’s African American population. About two-thirds of Ferguson’s
residents are Black, yet from 2012 to 2014 they accounted for 85 percent of traffic stops, 90 percent
of citations issued, and 93 percent of arrests. Blacks were more than twice as likely as Whites to be
searched during police stops while the proportion of these searches resulting in contraband being
found was significantly lower than searches of white drivers, “suggesting officers are impermissibly
considering race as a factor when determining whether to search” (p. 4). The report documents
several instances of racist epithets being used both in internal communications within departments
as well as during interactions with the police. As a result of Ferguson’s policing, the report argues,
“law enforcement is seen as illegitimate, and the partnerships necessary for public safety are, in
some areas, entirely absent” (p. 4).
Ferguson may be an extreme case, but the racial and economic disparities documented by the
Department of Justice are not limited to this suburb of St. Louis. The U.S. incarcerates more
people per capita, 693 people for every 100,000 residents, than any other nation in the world
(Wagner and Walsh, 2016). Historically disadvantaged groups in society are particularly likely to
be incarcerated. Inmates in state prisons have on average about a 10th grade education (Western,
2006), and the median incomes among prisoners, prior to incarceration, are about 40 percent lower
when compared to non-incarcerated people of similar ages (Rabuy and Kopf, 2015). Blacks and
Hispanics account for nearly 30 percent of the population, but make up nearly 60 percent of those
currently incarcerated (Minton and Zeng, 2015). Based on current trends, one in three black men
will serve time in prison, compared to one-in-six Hispanic males and one-in-seventeen white males
2Available online at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/
2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf
3Available online at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
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(Bonczar, 2003).
The origins of such disparities are complex. Marcus Aurelius is alleged to have said “Poverty
is the mother of crime.”4 Likewise, social disorganization theorists in the tradition of Shaw and
McKay (1942) argue that poverty and a lack of economic opportunity lead to a break down of
institutions of social control that in turn lead to acceptance of criminal behavior (e.g. Sampson
and Groves, 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997). Race and class are closely linked in the
U.S. Median incomes among Blacks and Hispanics are about $20,000 lower than Whites (DeNavas-
Walt and Proctor, 2014). As Tonry (1995) and others acknowledge, minorities are arrested and
imprisoned at higher rates in part because they commit more “imprisonable offenses.” Yet it is
unlikely that structural inequalities alone explains the observed pattern of racial disparities in the
criminal justice system.
First, a large body of research suggests that implicit racial biases–the subtle ways subconscious
associations between race and crime influence behavior–also exacerbate inequalities in the current
system. Research by Eberhardt and colleagues (2004; 2006) finds that people are more likely to
associate black faces with criminal traits, and that defendants judged to have more stereotypically
black facial features were more likely to receive the death penalty. Alpert, MacDonald and Dunham
(2005) find that when stopping Blacks, officers are more likely to rely on “non-behaviorial cues” –
things like the individual’s appearance and the context of where the stop occurred. Analyzing data
from New York City’s stop and frisk program, Gelman, Fagan and Kiss (2012) show that, even
after controlling for population and crime rates, Blacks and Hispanics were nearly twice as likely
to be stopped as Whites, but less likely to be arrested for an actual offense. Numerous studies
have documented that minority drivers are more likely to be stopped, ticketed, and searched by the
police (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel, 2014; Durose, Smith and Langan, 2007; Langan
et al., 2001; Harris, 1997). Like Ferguson, however, studies consistently find that the proportion
of those searches resulting in contraband being found are lower for Blacks and Hispanics than for
whites suggesting the police employ different standards based on a suspect’s race or appearance
when deciding who to search. For example, in Illinois, 63 percent of searches of white drivers
resulted in contraband being found compared to only 25 percent of searches of black drivers and
4The Roman emperor may have himself been quoting Aristotle, who wrote “poverty produces sedition and crime.”
(Aristot. Pol. 2.1265b from Rackham (1944), available online at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?
doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.perseus-eng1:2.1265b)
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14 percent for Hispanics.5
Implicit bias and structural inequality provide a foundation for why disparities exist in the U.S.
criminal justice system. They offer less insight, however, into why these gaps change so dramatically
over time. Instead scholars have highlighted explicitly political factors that have led to growing
inequality. Tonry, in particular, cites policies relating to the “war on drugs” as a prime driver of this
growing disparity (Tonry, 1995; Tonry and Melewski, 2008). In 1978, Whites made up 80 percent
of the population and accounted for around 80 percent of all drug arrests–which seems reasonable
given that studies consistently find that people of all races use and sell drugs at similar rates6. By
2006, however, Blacks were arrested for drug offense nearly four times as often as Whites. Tonry
and Melewski (2008, p. 29) conclude
[B]lack arrest rates are so much higher than white rates because police choose as a
strategic matter to invest more energy and effort in arresting blacks. So many more
blacks than whites are in prison because police officials have adopted practices, and
policy makers have enacted laws, that foreseeably treat black offenders much more
harshly than white ones.
The adoption of policies like the death penalty and mandatory sentencing provisions have
political origins. Smith (2004) shows how changes in state incarceration rates follow predictable
patterns of electoral cycles and partisan control: Incarceration grows during gubernatorial elections,
and declines with the share of Democrats in the legislature. (Lerman, 2013) shows how the enduring
political appeal of appearing “tough on crime” transformed the U.S. prisons from a system focused
on rehabilitation to one geared toward incapacitation and retribution. Tonry (2004, p.14) notes
that, despite similar levels of crime, incarceration rates rose in the U.S. while remaining stable
in Germany and falling by 60 percent in Finland, and concludes “Governments decide how much
punishment they want, and these decisions are in no simple way related to crime rates.” Instead,
Tonry argues public sentiment responds more to specific crises than long term trends fueling support
5See “Illinois Traffic Stop Study: 2014 Annual Report”, Illinois Department of Transportation, available online
at: https://idot.illinois.gov/transportation-system/local-transportation-partners/law-enforcement/
illinois-traffic-stop-study.Sanga (2009) finds similar results in Maryland. When the U.S. Customs Service
removed revamped its search criteria–removing race as determining factor–the total number of searches decreased,
while overall “hit-rates” (proportions of searches resulting in contraband being found) increased while disparities in
hit-rates across races declined (Ramirez, Hoopes and Quinlan, 2003)
6See for example, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (2013)
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for more punitive crime policies.
The inequalities in the criminal justice system not only have political causes, they also have
political consequences that make addressing such systemic issues more complicated. First, as
detailed below, contact with the criminal justice system appears to produce a pattern of democratic
withdrawal among those most adversely affected. Second, a significant portion of society appears
unconcerned with the disparate racial and economic impact of the current system. Together, these
political consequences create a challenge for reform: How can we break a cycle of inequality when
those most affected by disparities in the criminal justice system are the least likely to participate in
the political process, while those who are unaffected are often unlikely to recognize that problems
exist? Answers to this broad concern require further consideration of its constituent parts. How
exactly does the criminal justice system shape political behavior? And, how do citizens evaluate
the relative fairness of their legal system? Below, I detail existing explanations to these questions
and outline this dissertation’s contributions to these concerns.
1.2 Criminal Justice and Political Participation
The criminal justice system is one of the most visible and direct ways government influences citizens’
lives. The police, courts, and prisons touch people’s lives in many ways. According to the Bureau
of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) 2011 Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS), about 62.9 million U.S.
residents age 16 or older (about 26 percent of the population) reported having face-to-face contact
with the police in the past 12 months (Durose and Langton, 2013; Langton et al., 2013). Just
under half of these interactions were involuntary (i.e. police initated) and the FBI’s Uniform
Crime Reporting statistics estimate that there were over 11.2 million criminal arrests made in 2014
(United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014). The majority of
these arrests are tried in state and county courts, which handle between 93 to 106 million civil,
criminal, domestic, juvenile and traffic cases a year (LaFountain et al., 2015). In a given year,
approximately 32 million people get summoned for jury duty–of which, about 8 million actually
show up and 1.5 million end up serving on a jury (Mize, Hannaford-Agor and Waters, 2007). The
BJS estimates that just over 1.5 million people are currently held in federal and state prisons, while
the Prison Policy Initiative puts the total number of incarcrated at 2.3 million when accounting for
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local jails and other detention facilities.7
Neither contact with the criminal justice system nor its consequences are evenly distributed
across the population. Instead the impact of the criminal justice system is most evident to the
most disadvantaged in society. Racial and economic disparities in arrests, sentencing and incar-
ceration naturally have large economic and social consequences (Western, 2002, 2006; Western and
Wildeman, 2009). Only recently, however, have scholars in political science begun to comprehend
the political impact of such inequality. For example, following the close presidential elections in
2000, several studies debated whether changes to voting laws pertaining to (dis)enfranchisement of
felows and ex-felons could have swung the election (Burch, 2012, 2014, 2011). Legal prohibitions on
voting represent only one of the many ways the criminal justice system shapes political behavior.
In Arresting Citizenship, Lerman and Weaver (2014) contend that a significant portion of society
learns about politics through experiences with the police, courts, and prisons. Many Americans
have relatively infrequent and generally just experiences with these institutions.8 The “custodial
citizens” interviewed by Lerman and Weaver, however, tell a very different story. Many were
arrested at young ages beginning a cycle of contact with the criminal justice system that would
continue through most of their lives. As one interviewee noted “Once you mess up, you given
your life over to the government, because they got you. ... Democracy don’t get you a second
chance” (Lerman and Weaver, 2014, p.2). This pattern of repeated contact, Lerman and Weaver
argue, teaches citizens very different lessons about politics and the role of government in their
lives. Rather than to serve and protect, these custodial citizens come to see the police, courts and
prisons as institutions designed to monitor and oppress. Using a number of surveys, Lerman and
Weaver show that increasing levels of contact with the criminal justice system are associated with
decreasing levels of political trust, efficacy, and participation. For example, examining data from
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, they find that the decrease in predicted
probability of voting when comparing having no contact with the police to having served serious
7See Carson (2015) for the most recent federal figures and Peter Wagner and Bernadette Rabuy “Mass Incarcera-
tion: The Whole Pie 2016,” Prison Policy Initiative, March 14, 2016, available online at http://www.prisonpolicy.
org/reports/pie2016.html for estimates of total number of people currently incarcerated in local jails as well as
state and federal prisons.
8For example, according to the most recent Police-Public Contact Survey in 2011, nearly three-quarters of Amer-
icans reported no contact with the police in the past 12 months. Significant majorities of those involved in voluntary
contact with the police said they were satisfied with the experience and among those who reported involuntary
contact, most reported they were treated fairly. (Langton et al., 2013)
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time in prison is of the same magnitude as that for comparing being a college graduate to being
high school drop out (See Figure 8.1 Lerman and Weaver, 2014, p.221). Similarly Lerman (2013)
argues the experiences and social ties formed in prison unlearn the lessons of democracy, weakening
inmates’ abilities to function as citizens once they are released. Likewise, Burch (2014) finds that
higher concentrations of parolees are associated with lower levels of turnout at the neighborhood
level in North Carolina.
The evidence of democratic withdrawal caused by contact with the criminal justice system is
complicated by the issue of selection bias. In short, contact with the criminal justice system is cor-
related with the same demographic factors–age, education, income and race–that past studies find
predict lower levels of trust, efficacy and participation (Craig, Niemi and Silver, 1990; Brady, Verba
and Schlozman, 1995). With observational data alone, it is difficult to claim with certainty that
it is experiences with the criminal justice system–and not some correlated, potentially unobserved
factor–that are causing behavior. At least one study finds that when accounting for potential selec-
tion biases in the types of people who commit certain crimes, the effects of serving time in prison
on subsequent participation were diminished, and in some specifications, gone altogether (Gerber
et al., 2015). Still other studies leveraging different sources of exogenous variation find the effects
remain (e.g White, 2015; Weaver and Lerman, 2010). Whether and how these experiences have an
effect on politics remains an open and important question. Open, in the sense that the magnitude
and mechanisms of this effect remain debated. Important, because beyond widening participatory
gaps between the haves and have-nots in the U.S., these dynamics create a potential barrier to
addressing issues in the criminal justice system, by limiting the voices that form an important
constituency for reform.
1.3 Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System
Addressing inequality in the criminal justice system is further complicated by the way different
groups in society view justice in America. Work in political science, sociology, and criminology
consistently finds minorities and Blacks in particular possess dramatically different views from
Whites of the criminal justice system in the U.S. (Peﬄey and Hurwitz, 2010; Bobo and Johnson,
2004) Whites see the system as general fair and more likely to attribute what disparities exist to
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failures of the individual. Minorities, in contrast, hold more negative views of the police, courts, and
prisons, and are more likely to attribute inequality in the current system to systemic factors. These
beliefs in turn influence support for specific policies. In one particularly striking study, Peﬄey
and Hurwitz (2007) find that Whites who believe crime is rooted in dispositional characteristics of
individuals actually become more supportive of the death penalty when they are presented with
evidence that it disproportionately affects Black Americans.
The sources of this variation are relatively well understood. First, many argue these disparate
beliefs can be traced to the divergent experiences of Whites and minorities in the criminal justice
system. As Cole (1999, p. 9) writes in No Equal Justice, “[W]hatever the reasons, we have estab-
lished two systems of criminal justice: one for the privileged, and another for the less privileged”.
Contrasting the systemic racial and economic disparities with a legal system that “On the face of
it ... is color-blind and class blind.” Cole (1999, p. 8) argues
[T]his only makes the problem worse. The rhetoric of the criminal justice system sends
the message that our society carefully protects everyone’s constitutional rights, but in
practice the rules assure that law enforcement prerogatives will generally prevail over
the rights of minorities and the poor.
Not only do Whites tend to see the criminal justice system in a manner consistent with their
personal experience (e.g Durose and Langton, 2013; Langton et al., 2013), they also have a difficult
time imagining it could be different for any one else. Following Brown’s death in Ferguson and the
death of Eric Garner in New York City, a poll by the Washington Post and ABC News poll found
that 74 percent of black respondents felt these deaths were “a sign of broader problems in treatment
of African Americans by police” while 60 percent of Whites felt they were isolated incidents.9
Second, the gaps in how Whites and minorities evaluate the criminal justice system are further
widened by information conveyed vicariously through social interactions and the media. People tend
to associate with individuals similar to themselves (Marsden, 1987; Huber and Malhotra, 2013),
and are increasingly able to seek out media that is consistent with their prior beliefs (Stroud,
2008, 2010). Interviewing young black males in St. Louis, Brunson (2007) finds even participants
9See Washington Post-ABC News poll Dec. 10-13, 2015 available online at: https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/polling/washington-postabc-news-poll-december-1114/2015/01/04/
b6f831be-8518-11e4-abcf-5a3d7b3b20b8_page.html
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who never personally experienced mistreatment come to hold negative attitudes about the police
through the experiences of their peers. Similarly, both Rosenbaum et al. (2005) and Mondak et al.
(n.d.) find that people’s views of the police and courts are shaped by the experiences of their peers.
The way the media cover crime also influences how people evaluate the the criminal justice system
in general as well as the efficacy of specific policies. Summarizing the media’s coverage of crime,
Gilliam et al. (1996, p. 8) find “the typical news story on crime consists of two ‘scripts’: crime is
violent, and criminals are non-white,” but Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) find that it is predominantly
Whites, and not Blacks, who are influenced by these frames.
Finally, variation in how people see the criminal justice system likely reflect dispositional dif-
ferences in people’s worldviews or ideologies. Political scientists note that conservatives tend to
evaluate the police, courts, and government authority more positively (Conover and Feldman, 1981).
Similarly, social psychologists often view conservatives’ tendency to support the status quo and in-
stitutions of authority as either a form of motivated cognition (Jost and Amodio, 2012; Toorn et al.,
2014) or evidence of different moral foundations (Haidt and Graham, 2007).
Each of these explanations offers insights into why opinions of the criminal justice system differ
so markedly by race. Each of these explanations also differs in the extent to which it emphasize
factors which are internal or external to the individual, the degree to which these factors may
change over time, and the amount of control individuals exert over these mechanisms.
At one end of the spectrum of explanations are characteristics of the individuals themselves:
variation due to thing like race, ideology and other traits that are largely fixed and stable through-
out a person’s life (Alford, Funk and Hibbing, 2008; Mondak, 2010). Since these factors do not
change, they likely contribute to observed differences by conditioning the effects of things that vary
situationally: namely the information conveyed through directly personal experience and indirectly
through social interactions and the media.
We can think about these trait by situation interactions in several ways. First, we may ask
how often situations occur for people of different traits. Since Whites tend to know more Whites
than Blacks, the chance that they hear about a black person’s experiences with the police will
be lower. Similarly, liberals and conservatives appear to be increasingly able to to seek out the
information they want and avoid the information they do not want. All else equal, the chance that
a liberal encounters a news story about racial disparities in criminal justice will be higher than a
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conservative. Second, we may ask what is the effect of this situational variation when it does occur.
For a white person, does hearing about a minority’s experience of being racially profiled change
how he or she thinks about the relative fairness of the police and courts? Does it matter if this
information is conveyed personally from a peer or impersonally through the news? The answers to
this second type of question are complicated. For example, we may find that Whites with more
black acquaintances perceive greater injustice in the criminal system. This may be because their
interactions with black peers provide information that leads them to update their beliefs. Or it may
be that Whites who have more Black peers tend to be more liberal and it is their ideology (or some
other fixed, dispositional trait) rather than their social interactions that explains this variation.
The challenges of inferring causality from observational data are well known (Angrist and Pischke,
2008; Rubin, 1986) and lead us to ask a third question which is what is the effect of these situations
if they occurred compared to a world in which they did not occur? The most common approach
answering this question–experimentally manipulating exposure to some causal mechanism–is not
quite sufficient. Say for example, we randomly assigned people to read about racial discrimination
or talk to someone of either the same race or different race about the issue. The average treatment
effect from this experiment might be positive leading us to infer such information and experiences
change attitudes, but focusing only on this overall effect may obscure considerable heterogeneity
at the individual level (Gaines and Kuklinski, 2011; Knox et al., n.d.). Specifically, the effect may
be positive for those disposed to have these experiences already, but negative for those who might
otherwise avoid them. Clearly then, any answer to this question requires a consideration of how
the process self-selection may alter the results.
Collectively, these multiple explanations raise questions both about the possibility for evalua-
tions of the criminal justice system to change and the factors that may bring about such change.
If evaluations of the criminal justice system were primarily informed by dispositional beliefs, then
bridging divides between those who see the system as fair may be difficult, as such dispositions
are unlikely to change. Even if dispositions are not the primary source of the belief, they may still
play a crucial role in shaping both the incidence and consequence of factors that do change beliefs.
For example, intergroup contact has been shown to decrease stereotypes and increase empathy for
the outgroup (Pettigrew, 1998, 2008). As such, knowing people with more direct experiences with
injustice may alter one’s perceptions of the systemic fairness of the criminal justice system. As with
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the study of contact with the criminal justice system and political behavior, however, it is difficult
to know whether these experiences or some unobserved factor that are driving these relationships.
A portion of these experiences are likely determined by factors beyond their control.10 But with
only observational data, it is at least plausible that beliefs drive experience. People disposed to see
the world a certain way could seek out experiences and information that confirm those beliefs, and
how they would respond to information that runs counter to those beliefs remains unknown.
1.4 Plan for the Dissertation
The studies in this dissertation represent initial steps toward answering the questions raised above.
Chapter Two explores the potential mechanisms through which being charged with an offense by
the police may alter political participation. While such contact is non-random, whether it occurred
in the weeks before or after an election is plausibly as good as random. Pairing court data from
Indiana with validated voter files, I examine how the effects of contact vary conditionally based on
factors relating to the nature and outcome of the contact, characteristics of the citizen, and the
context in which such contact occurred
Chapter Three turns to the question of who perceives injustice in citizens’ interactions with the
police and the extent to which a person’s race conditions these evaluations. Using data from two
survey experiments, it shows how the effects of respondents’ general beliefs about the fairness of
the police vary according to their own race and features of interactions they are asked to evaluate.
Chapter Four explores the way dispositions condition the effects of experience using both obser-
vational data and a unique survey experiment. Specifically, the observational data assess the degree
to which vicarious exposure to minority experiences with the police influence people’s evaluations
of those interactions. These results are tempered by a unique survey experiment, which depicts a
more heterogeneous pattern of response when taking into account individuals’ tendencies to select
into and out of certain information environments.
Chapter Five concludes, by summarizing the main results and discussing implications for future
research and policy.
10For example, people can choose whether to speed or not, but they have little to no control over how the officer
treats them if and when he or she is stopped. Similarly, while individuals may seek out people similar to themselves
in social interactions, there are situations and contexts, such as the workplace, where people may be forced to interact
with individuals they would have otherwise avoided (e.g. Mondak and Mutz, 2001; Mutz and Mondak, 2006).
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Chapter 2
Contact with the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem and Political Participation
2.1 Introduction
Contact with the criminal justice system is one of the most common and visible forms of a citizen’s
interaction with government. From traffic stops to felony offenses, jury duty and calls for service,
these experiences represent one of the most direct and influential ways government can shape our
lives. The incidence and nature of this contact, however, both reveal and perpetuate systemic racial
and economic inequality in the U.S. Simply put, at almost every point of the legal process, from
contact and arrests to sentencing and incarceration, the poor, the non-white, and in particular, the
poor who are non-white, fare far worse than the average white citizen.
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that scholars have recognized that these inequalities have larger
democratic consequences. Lerman (2013) shows that the growing carceral state leads citizens to
unlearn lessons of democracy. Similarly, Lerman and Weaver (2014) find that increasing levels of
contact with the criminal justice system are associated with decreasing levels of trust, efficacy, and
participation. Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2014) explore how even an incident as
seemingly mundane as a traffic stop can have profound political consequences as they are often
used as a tool for investigative policing practices that disproportionately effect minorities living in
poor communities.
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These dynamics are worrying. If certain types of disparate contact with the criminal justice
system can lead some citizens to withdraw from politics, this creates a vicious cycle: the people
perhaps most in need of representation and reform are also the least likely to take advantage of the
formal political mechanisms available to them.
Addressing these inequalities requires an understanding of the mechanisms at work. Existing
research provides a general framework which argues that in addition to legal and material costs, the
these experiences have a socializing effect on citizens that leads them to disengage with the political
process. Yet, there are many possible patterns of individual response to contact with the criminal
justice system that could produce the aggregate dynamics that we observe. The challenge, of course,
is that the same characteristics that tend to predict whether one will be likely to participate in
politics are the same factors associated with whether one is arrested by the police or convicted by
the courts.
To overcome this challenge, I leverage the fact that while contact with the criminal justice
system may be non-random, whether that contact occurred in the days before or after an election
is plausibly as good as random. To measure contact and voting, I combine court data from Indiana
with validated records of voter turnout for the past six presidential and midterm elections from 2004
to 2014. Treating the timing of those offenses in relation to election day as a natural experiment,
I use a regression discontinuity design to assess the effects of involuntary contact with the police
on the probability of voting in an election. I find, across a number of specifications, that contact
reduces turnout by about 2-4 percentage points. To explore the mechanisms behind this effect, I
then examine how the impact of contact varies across individuals, experiences, and contexts. I find
that characteristics of the individual, such as his or her age, income, and voting history, condition
the effects of contact in ways we might expect. I also show that the magnitude of these effects
varies by characteristics of the experience, such as the severity of the crime, outcome of the case,
and whether the incident was a citizen’s first offense. I find evidence that in some cases the effects
of these experiences are larger for Blacks, but that in others the responses of Blacks and Whites are
more similar than different. Combined with the disparate rates of these experiences, these results
suggest contact with the criminal justice system serves to widen the participatory gaps between
Whites and Blacks.
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2.2 Contact with the Criminal Justice System and Political Participation
The criminal justice system is one of the most tangible and influential representations of govern-
mental power in our lives. In a very basic sense it exists to fufill a core promise of the social
contract that leads us to form governments in the first place. Yet, not everyone benefits from this
arrangement. Traditionally disadvantaged groups in society, such as the poor, racial minorities,
and in particular, poor racial minorities, suffer more severe and frequent consequences from their
contact with the criminal justice system (Western and Wildeman, 2009; Western, 2006; Spohn,
2013). One frequently cited study by Bonczar (2003) estimates that based on recent trends in
incarceration, one-in-three Black men will be incarcerated in his lifetime, compared with one-in-six
Latino men, and one-in-17 White men.1 Overall, Blacks are arrested nearly three times more often
than are members of other races.2 During arrests, Blacks are more likely to be subjected to police
searches (Bowling and Phillips, 2007; Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel, 2014) and to both
the threat and use of police force (Jacobs, 1998; Eith and Durose, 2011). At trial, Blacks and other
minorities tend to receive worse representation (Kutateladze et al., 2014) and suffer harsher out-
comes (Mustard, 2001), particularly when facing all-White juries (Anwar, Bayer and Hjalmarsson,
2012). Although racial and ethnic minorities make up about 40 percent of the population in the
U.S., they account for over 60 percent of those currently incarcerated in our jails and prisons.3 It is
not surprising, then, that scholars have begun to assess the larger democratic consequences of our
criminal justice system in general and the effects of these systemic racial disparities in particular.
There are at least three ways in which such contact can affect political participation. First,
there are legal consequences of contact with the judicial system, ones that can hamper or preclude
civic engagement. A person being held in jail on bond cannot make it to the polls and 48 out of 50
1Tonry (1995) argues that these growing disparities are due in large part to policy changes, notably drug sen-
tencing laws, that disproportionately affect blacks and other racial minorities. Blacks make up about 13 percent
of the American population and studies suggest that they use illicit drugs at rates comparable to their peers
(Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2013). Yet, Blacks account for over 30 percent
of arrests and over 40 percent of incarcerations for drug law violations. (See “The Drug War, Mass Incarcera-
tion and Race”, Drug Policy Alliance, (2015, 12 June), Retrieved from: http://www.drugpolicy.org/resource/
drug-war-mass-incarceration-and-race)
2See Heath, Brady (2014, November 14). Racial gaps in U.S. arrest rates: ‘Staggering disparity’. USA To-
day. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates/
19043207/
3See “Racial Disparity”, The Sentencing Project, Retrieved from http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/
page.cfm?id=122
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U.S. states (as well as the District of Columbia) place restrictions on felon voting rights.4 In the
wake of the Florida recount in the 2000 presidential election, several studies have debated whether
felon voting would have swung the election (Burch, 2012, 2014), who the affected individuals would
vote for in general (Burch, 2011), and if these past offendeners be mobilized to go to the polls
(Gerber et al., 2014).
Related to the physical and legal barriers to voting, contact with the criminal justice system
can have profound economic and material consequences. People who serve time in prison have
lower lifetime earnings and a far smaller chance of moving out of poverty than their peers (West-
ern, 2006; Pettit and Western, 2004; Western, 2002). Going to court costs time and money, and
serving time has profound effects not just on the individuals who are incarcerated, but also on their
families (Braman, 2004). From the perspective of both resource-and-opportunity based models of
participation, citizens dealing with the police and courts may have neither the time nor the assets
necessary to participate in politics .
Recently, scholars have begun to explore a third path through which contact with the criminal
justice system can affect political behavior. Drawing on theories of policy feedback, Lerman and
Weaver (2010, 2014) show that contact with the criminal justice system is an important socializing
experience, and, given the racial inequalities embedded within the U.S. system, one that teaches
minorities very different lessons about their status as citizens and the role of politics in their lives.5
Using a number of observational datasets, they show that increasing levels of contact with the
criminal justice system lead to lower levels of trust, external efficacy and participation.
This policy feedback approach is important for several reasons. First, it suggests that the po-
litical consequences of contact with the criminal justice system extend beyond just the population
of disenfranchised felons (who by themselves are a significant and growing segment of the popula-
tion). Second, it draws our attention to the psychological and social mechanisms through which
these experiences can shape our behavior, in turn, raising further question about the effects (if
any) of any one encounter with the criminal justice system on political behavior and the specific
mechanisms behind these results.
4See National Conference of State Legislatures, “Felon Voting Rights,”(2016, January 1) Retrieved from http://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx. Only Maine and Vermont allow
felons to vote while incarcerated.
5Justice and Meares (2014) make similar arguments with regard to the criminal justice system, as do Soss, Fording
and Schram (2011) in their examination of policies dealing with welfare and poverty.
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In short, there are many patterns of individual response to contact with the criminal justice
system that produce the aggregate results observed by Lerman and others. For example, it may
simply be the case that contact is correlated with other socio-economic factors that also predict
these outcomes, such that the observed relationships are spurious. Lerman and Weaver employ a
number of techniques, including multiple regressions, subgroup analysis, and covariate adjustments
via matching to try to rule out this possibility. Using administrative data from Pennsylvania,
Gerber et al. (2015) find that once the nature of the offense the is taken into account, the negative
effects of serving time in prison are greatly diminished. Second, contact may matter, but its
effects may be cumulative and apparent only when examined within the full context of individuals’
lives. One bad run-in with the law may have little or no effect on a potentially habitual behavior
like voting (Plutzer, 2002), but over the course of an individual’s life, the cumulative effect of
these experiences in concert with other factors may produce the observed differences in attitudes
and behavior. Third, it is possible that the effects of an individual experience can be large and
significant, but conditional on things like the type of contact, the characteristics of the person, and
the context in which the contact occurred. For example, being pulled over for a traffic stop may be
an inconvenience for most people, but for minorities who feel racially profiled, it may have more
profound democratic consequences (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel, 2014). Consistent
with Lerman and Weaver’s account, such experiences may provide evidence that government, as
represented by law enforcement and the legal system, is a cause of rather than a solution to a
person’s problems, leading them to withdraw from politics. However, there may also be individuals
and contexts where such experiences provide the motivation for increased action and voice.6 Finally,
it may be the case that multiple mechanisms are at work. Contact may have a direct effect on
participation through legal, physical and material means, while the attitudinal consequences (in
terms of trust and efficacy) arise not from an individual’s personal experience but rather from the
collective shared experience of people like them. Answering these questions, however, requires us
to separate the effects of contact with the criminal justice system from the factors that predict it,
and I now turn to a unique dataset and design intended to do just that.
6Much of the work on emotion in politics, for example, finds that experiences that produce anger can be a catalyst
for increased participation (Brader, 2006; Valentino et al., 2011).
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2.3 Data, Design & Expectations
Contact with the criminal justice system is non-random and correlated with socio-economic factors
that also predict citizens’ withdrawal from politics. However, whether that contact occurred in the
days before or after an election is plausibly as good as random. Thus, the timing of general elections
in the U.S. creates an exogenous source of variation that can be used to identify the causal effect
of contact on turnout. In this section, I begin by describing the unique data used for this analysis.
Next, I present the basic logic and assumptions of the regression discontinuity design and discuss
some of the specific issues and decisions relating to estimation. Finally, I conclude by offering a
brief set of expectations based on the discussion from the previous section.
2.3.1 Court Data and Voting Records
To assess the effects of contact with the criminal justice system on political behavior, I draw on
two sources of data. First, I obtain a measure of people’s contact with the criminal justice system
through court records from the state of Indiana’s Odyssey Case Management System (CMS) for
Indiana Courts and Clerks7. Next, I merged these data with voter history files maintained by
Catalist, an organization that maintains voter files for all 50 states to help progressive campaigns
and causes, to obtain a record of each defendant’s voting history in the past six elections, (from
2004 to 2014)8
The Odyssey CMS was created in 2007 with the intent of providing a unified reporting system
for all of Indiana’s court records. The system is paid for and implemented by the State Supreme
Court. Participation is voluntary, with local courts and counties having to pass an ordinance to
adopt the system. Figures 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, show the total number of criminal and traffic
cases by county in the sample. The data cover about 60 percent of courts and counties in Indiana,
including Marion County and several of the state’s more racially diverse counties, such as St. Joseph
(12.7 percent black), Allen (11.7 percent black), LaPorte (10.8 percent black), and Vandeburgh (9.1
percent black).
7See http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/2666.htm
8See http://www.catalist.us/
17
Figure 2.1: Total Number of Criminal Cases by County in Indiana 2004 to 2015
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Given the voluntary nature of the program, one may be concerned that the counties that opt out
of Odyssey differ systematically from those that participate. The implementation of the program
appears to be driven largely by the bureaucratic resources of the judiciary and the costs associated
with the transition of each court’s old records.9 If participation is largely random, and unrelated
to the incidence and consequence of contact with the police and courts, then the exclusion of these
cases simply lowers the statistical power of my test. If participation is systemically related to voting
and contact, it seems likely that courts that do not want their records freely available may have
something to hide, and that contact with these courts would probably have even more negative
democratic consequences. Such selective participation would likely lead my results to provide a
conservative estimate of real effects of contact on participation.
In total, I obtained records from over 2.3 million criminal cases as well as 3.8 million traffic
cases from January 1, 2004 to August 31, 2015. On average, there are a little more than 1,000
traffic offenses and a little under 500 criminal offenses committed each day that eventually reach
trial.10 Just under 0.5 percent of the cases in both datasets contain offense dates that fall outside
the specified range (likely reflecting errors in data entry). It is also important to note that there
are few outliers within the period of 2004 to 2015 in the traffic data. Specifically, there appear
to be 18,452 traffic cases (0.4 percent of the total observations) with an offense date of December
16, 2004. An initial examination of related dates associated with these cases suggest some of these
cases may reflect data entry errors and not some massive “click it or ticket” campaign. As a result,
I focus most of my analyses and expectations on criminal contact, using the traffic cases as another
form or robustness check. Traffic offenses that were recorded as having occurred on December
16, 2004 are excluded from the analysis, although the results reported below are robust to their
inclusion.
These data possess three key features: First, they contain defendants’ names, addresses, dates of
birth and gender, which allows me to match defendants to voter records from Indiana. Second, each
9For more on the history and implementation of this system see “If You Build It, They Will
Use It”, Indiana Court Times, December 20, 2012, online at http://indianacourts.us/times/2012/12/
if-you-build-it-they-will-use-it/, Mary L. DePrez, “Revisiting the Vision” Indiana Court Times, Febru-
ary 28, 2010, online at http://indianacourts.us/times/2010/02/revisiting-the-vision/ and Hon. Frank
Sullivan, Jr.,“Our Odyssey Begins”, February 29, 2008, online at http://indianacourts.us/times/2008/02/
our-odyssey-begins/.
10The data do not include information on respondents who, for example, received a written warning from the police
as opposed to a traffic ticket.
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case contains an offense date when the defendant was charged by the police, marking the beginning
of this instance of contact with the criminal justice system. As I discuss below, this information is
crucial because it allows me to identify instances of contact before and after elections. Third, the
court records contain a number of additional, relevant pieces of information, such as the defendant’s
race (determined by the arresting officer), the severity of the offense, and the outcome of the case,
that in turn allow me to test hypotheses about the conditional effects of these experiences.
To obtain validated measures of defendants’ voting histories, I merge the court data with voter
files maintained by Catalist, a source of validated voter turnout for several prior studies(e.g An-
solabehere and Hersh, 2012; Fraga, 2015). Overall, I am able to match about 70 percent of the
defendants to records in Catalist’s database. The voting data are then merged with the court data
and made anonymous to produce the final dataset used in this analysis. The 30 percent of cases
without a match in Catalist are coded as instances of non-voting for all six elections, and retained
in the analysis. Table 2.1 presents the results of this process, comparing the turnout in Catalist’s
records to turnout among defendants in a criminal case in the past six elections. As one might
expect, turnout in this group is lower than the general population but still significant and consistent
with rates found in similar studies (Gerber et al., 2014; Lerman and Weaver, 2014; White, 2015).11
Table 2.1: Voter Turnout in Indiana
Indiana Crimal Cases
Year # Voters % Voters % Pop # Defendants # Voters % Def Voting
2004 2512142 55.9 36.9 370160 65867 17.8
2006 1719351 38.3 25.3 400938 38547 9.6
2008 2805986 62.5 41.2 409844 108503 26.5
2010 1786213 39.8 26.2 422971 44814 10.6
2012 2663368 59.3 39.1 412980 88794 21.5
2014 1388370 30.9 20.4 309687 18393 5.9
Note: The first column shows the reported turnout in Indiana in in each election year. The next
two columns present turnout as percentage of registered voters and the state population. The
remaining columns show, respectively, the number of criminal cases within a year of each election,
the number of defendants identified in Catalist as having voted in that election year, and the
percentage of defendants that voted.
11Indiana allows registered voters to cast an in-person absentee ballot 28 days before the election. The data do not
distinguish whether the person cast a ballot early or on election day. As long as rates of early voting are uncorrelated
with the timing of the offense the failure to distinguish early votes from votes cast on election day should not bias
the estimates.
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2.3.2 The Logic of the Regression Discontinuity Design
By pairing court data with validated voter files, I am able to assess the effects of contact with the
criminal justice system on political participation through a regression discontinuity design.
First employed by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) to study the effects of scholarships on
academic performance, regression discontinuity designs have become commonplace in economics
and increasingly popular in political science (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010;
Skovron and Titiunik, 2015). The approach has been used to study incumbency advantage (Lee,
2001, 2008; Caughey and Sekhon, 2011), the effects of advertisements on turnout (Keele and Titiu-
nik, 2015), and and the effect of losing one’s job on voting (Incantalupo, 2012).
All regression discontinuity designs share three common elements, a score or forcing variable
(Xi), an observable, exogenously fixed cutoff, (x0), and a treatment (Di)that is a deterministic
function of these scores and cutoff:
Di =

0, if Xi ≤ x0
1, otherwise
In the present study, the timing of a defendant’s offense date is the forcing variable, that relative
to the closest general election, determines the receipt of treatment (i.e. whether contact with the
police occurred before or after election). Specifically, there are six elections in my data, three
presidential elections and three midterm elections. Each case record contains an offense date that
marks the day an individual was charged with an offense by the police. For each defendant, I
calculate the time in days that their offense occurred relative to the nearest election within a one
year interval. Someone arrested, on November 1, 2004, one day before that year’s the presidential
election on November 2, would have a value of -1 on the forcing variable and a 0 on the indicator
of treatment (indicating contact before the election). Someone arrested two days after the election
would have a positive value of 2 on the forcing variable and a value of 1 on the treatment indicator
(indicating contact after the the election). Someone arrested on the day of the election would be
given a value of 0 on the forcing variable. In the analysis below, I treat them as having been
contacted before the election (perhaps they were speeding to make it to the polling station), but
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the results are robust to treating these instances of contact as occurring after the election.12
From this set up, there are two paths to causal identification. The standard approach, formalized
by Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001), relies on an assumption of continuity at the cutoff,
such that if the regression functions E[Yi(D = 1)|Xi] and E[Yi(D = 0)|Xi] are continuous at the
threshold, then
lim
x↓x0
E[Yi(D = 1)|Xi = x]− lim
x↑x0
E[Yi(D = 0)|Xi = x]
= E[Yi(D = 1)− Yi(D = 0)|Xi = x0]
Assuming continuity at the cutoff allows the cases just below and just above the cutoff to serve as
counterfactuals for each other, with any change in the outcome being attributed solely to receipt
of treatment, in this case, being charged with an offense.
Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik (2015) propose an alternative approach to identification that
relies on an assumption of local randomization. For a given window, W0, of observations around
the cutoff, it is assumed that the distribution of scores within that window can be be considered “as
good as randomly assigned” and “potential outcomes within the window depend only on the score
only through the treatment indicators within the window.” (Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik,
2015, 4). From this assumption, p-values for a test of no effect can be obtained through randomiza-
tion inference and confidence intervals constructed by inverting a series of hypothesis tests (which
often, but need not, also assume constant additive treatment effects)(Rosenbaum, 2010, 2005). Fur-
thermore, Sales and Hansen (2014) show this approach can be extended to include transformation
of the data that remove trends between the outcome and forcing variable.
Both approaches lead to observable implications in the data that should justify the design.
First, if the incidence of contact is plausibly as good as random, then the incidence of such contact
12An alternative approach to constructing the forcing variable would be to treat all elections separately. Thus,
contact occurring a day before the election in 2004 would be coded as -1 in that model and -371 in the model for
2006 when the next election occurred. For reasons discussed below, I focus primarily on results obtained by pooling
elections and report findings for individual years and election types in the appendix. The results do not change the
substantive conclusion that contact matters, and thus I prefer the pooled models for brevity and clarity.
22
should look similar around the cutoff.13 Second, if contact is plausibly random, then there should
only be chance differences in observable covariates of the groups that had contact before and after
the election. Third, if contact is truly influencing behavior, then timing of contact relative to the
closest election should have no effect on the probability of turnout in the previous general election.
That is, if you were charged with an offense right before the 2010 election, that should have no
bearing on whether you voted in the 2008 election.
Each approach carries with it some specific concerns relating to estimation. Designs assum-
ing continuity at the cutoff require researchers to choose between parametric and non-parametric
models for the regression discontinuity, and, depending on that choice, a window of observations to
estimate these effects. Designs proceeding from an assumption of local randomization, also require
researchers to select a window of observations, as well as a test statistic (or statistics) to report and
whether a linear transformation of the the data is needed to satisfy the assumptions of the model
(Sales and Hansen, 2014).
In the analysis below, I take the following approach. First, I present results using parametric
polynomial regressions assuming continuity at the cutoff. While flexible local linear regressions
are often preferred effects at the cutoff, Lee and Card (2008) show they are inappropriate for
a discrete forcing variable, and instead recommend using nth order polynomial regressions with
robust clustered standard errors to reflect the increased modeling uncertainty of the discrete forcing
variable. The general form of these polynomial regressions is as follows:
Yi = α+ β01Xi + β02X
2
i + . . . β0pX
p
i
+ ρDi + β
∗
1DiXi + β
∗
2DiX
2
i + . . . β
∗
pDiX
p
i + 
with the coefficient ρ providing an estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE) at the
election day cutoff. The interaction between the forcing variable and the treatment indicator allows
the shape of the regressions to vary on either side of the threshold. The higher the degree, the
more flexibility, but at the cost of potential specification error (i.e. overfitting the data).
13There may be reasons to assume that police behavior will vary around elections. Resources may be devoted to
allow police unions to vote. Or a county sheriff might increase arrests before an election to improve his or her chances
of winning the election (Huber and Gordon, 2004). As I will show below, the overall pattern of criminal cases appears
smooth; however, there appears to a be a small, but under some specifications, statistically significant discontinuity
among traffic cases with more stops after the election. I discuss these issues and their possible threats to inference
further in the conclusion of this section.
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Gelman and co-authors (2015; 2014) illustrate the dangers of such specification error and warn
against over-fitting with high order polynomials.Gelman and Imbens (2014) show the weights in
these models can be particularly “noisy,” with observations far from the cutoff sometimes receiving
large weights that appear at odds with the original goal of the design (i.e. estimating the disconti-
nuity at the cutoff). In the main results, I attempt to address these concerns in three ways. First,
I limit the window of observations to 60 days before and after an election. Although somewhat
arbitrary, this initial time frame was chosen with the goal of identifying the effects of contact due
both to the more immediate legal and material consequences of these experiences as well the more
long-term psychological mechanisms posited by policy feedback models. Second, all models are
estimated using quadratic polynomials, to allow for some non-linearity in the forcing variable (due
perhaps to seasonal variation in crime and policing) while attempting to avoid over-fitting the data.
To show the robustness of these results, I estimate models up to a sixth-degree polynomial over a
range of time frames around the election. Third, as an additional robustness check, I report esti-
mates obtained assuming local randomization, without transformations, for 5- and 10-day windows
around the election.14
2.3.3 Expectations
Before presenting the results of these analyses, I briefly describe my expectations based on previous
research on the political effects of contact with the criminal justice system and broader theories
of political behavior. First, with regard to any criminal contact with the police, I expect that,
consistent with past research (Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Weaver and Lerman, 2010), such expe-
riences will lead to lower levels of participation. While such aggregate effects do not allow me to
directly speak to the mechanisms at work, by exploring how these effects vary across subgroups and
contexts, I hope to shed light on the ways in which different psychological and physical mechanisms
may be at work. Specifically, I examine variation in effects by characteristics of the individual, the
contact, and the context in which it occurred.
With regard to individuals, I explore how the effects of contact vary by race and socioeconomic
status. I also explore how these effects vary by a defendant’s age and voting history. For some
individuals, such as those with relatively high social and economic status, a traffic ticket or court
14Window selection is discussed in further detail below and in the appendix
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summons may be nothing more than an inconvenience. For others, the experience of being detained
by the police for reasons that are perceived to (and often do) involve a person’s race and economic
class likely has a profoundly more anti-democratic effect. Given the intersections of race and class,
and the general patterns of racial disparities in the criminal justice system in the U.S., I expect that
the negative effects of contact will be larger for Blacks than for Whites, and larger for the poor than
for the rich.15 Although the court data do not contain direct measures of defendant income, I use
defendant addresses to obtain 2010 Census level estimates of income in their ZIP code. Similarly, I
expect the negative effects of contact should be larger for more habitual voters, older citizens, and
those who voted in the last election. These effects may be larger for two reasons. First, there may
be a floor to the effect of contact on unlikely or infrequent voters. Second, although not directly
measurable with these data, the experience of being charged with an offense may carry different
psychological meanings and burderns to more habitual voters such as social stigma or shame of
having their name appear in local crime reports.
Next, I examine the extent to which the effect of contact varies by characteristics of the person’s
experience. If contact has a socializing effect that leads citizens to withdraw from politics (Lerman
and Weaver, 2014), we should expect that an individuals first encounter with the criminal justice
system will have the largest effect on the probability of participating, while subsequent experiences
may have little to no effect. Furthermore, I expect that the negative effects of contact will increase
with the severity of the offense. At the extreme, a person convicted of a felony in Indiana is
legally restricted from voting until completion of the sentence. Similarly, someone jailed for a more
minor offense might be physically unable to make it to the polling station. Of course, the types of
individuals most likely to be charged with such crimes are probably comparatively unlikely to vote
in the first place. An alternative hypothesis is that the most democratically damaging types of
contact are those wherein the potential for police discretion and discrimination are highest, such as
traffic stops that may result from racial profiling (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel, 2014)
and charges that are ultimately dismissed.
15It is also possible that the kinds of experiences that demobilize the resource poor in society can actually mobilize
the resource rich. Alternatively those who may be predisposed to view such experiences as unjust may find them
generally demobilizing, unless there is opportunity to do something by supporting a candidate campaigning on
criminal justice reform or voting out a current judge or sheriff. I will also explore the potential for some types of
contact to actually increase participation among some types of people in some contexts, although I expect such cases
to be relatively rare.
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Finally, I consider how the effects of contact may vary by the context in which it occurred. Police
practices can vary significantly from department to department, reflecting a number of institutional
and social factors. For example, the Department of Justice Investigation of the Ferguson Police
Department found that the department used traffic stops as a significant source of revenue.16
Because the majority of Indiana’s minority population live in urban settings, I assess whether the
effects of contact vary based on whether they occur in Indianapolis and the surrounding Marion
County or the remaining counties in the dataset.
2.4 Results
I begin my analysis by presenting a series of tests of assumptions of the regression discontinuity
design. The results are consistent with the necessary conditions to identify the causal effects of
contact with the criminal justice system on voter turnout. Next, I present the main results for
criminal defendants from pooling the six general elections together. I show that these estimates are
robust to a number of specifications and estimation strategies. To explore the potential mechanisms
behind these effects, I assess how the effects of contact vary by characteristics of the individual,
the context, and the experience.
2.4.1 Identifying Assumptions
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of criminal cases before and after the election. The black line
shows the fitted values from a second-order polynomial (i.e. quadratic) regression, the grey dots
show the binned averages of turnout for each day before or after the election (pooled across six
elections), and the dashed line shows the Election Day cutoff. Although there appears to be
considerable seasonal variation (relatively few arrests around Christmas, for example) there does
not appear to be evidence of either defendants or the police drastically altering their behavior on
Election day. The discontinuity at the cutoff is substantively small17 and the overall downward
trend in arrests around the election appears to be the opposite of what we would expect if police
16See http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
17The model shown in Figure 2.3, estimates about 21 more arrests after the election (p = 0.93) and generally within
plus or minus a few hundred cases depending on the order of polynomial and range of dates considered.
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departments were actively trying influence elections.18
Figure 2.3: Criminal Cases in Days Before and After Elections
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Both assumptions of continuity and local randomization lead us to expect there should be
few observable differences in the characteristics of defendants stopped before or after an election.
Table 2.2 presents the results of this comparison for the set of observable covariates available from
the court records. We see that defendants charged before or after an election are similar in terms
of age, income, gender, and, importantly, the proportions of Whites and Blacks. While some of
these differences are statistically significant, their substantively small size suggests this is a product
of the large sample size rather than a violation of the assumptions of the regression discontinuity
design.19
Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 present similar analyses for the traffic data. We see that a potential
discontinuity estimated with a quadratic polynomial regression appears slightly larger (ρ = 784),
in part because traffic cases are more common, but this difference is not statistically significant
(p = 0.20). Again, the overall trends do not suggest any evidence of manipulation. The tests for
18It is possible that these aggregate results mask individual variations across departments and counties. This kind
of local variation is one of the many possible avenues of future research for these and similar data.
19The one exception is that individuals appear to be slightly more likely to be charged with a first offense before
the election. This may be due in part to the general downward trend in arrests over this period. Balance tests
conducted on the narrower time periods used for randomization inference yield non-significant differences
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Table 2.2: Covariate Balance in Criminal Data
Mean-Pre Mean-Post Difference Stat P(>|t|)
Age 33.43 33.21 -0.21 4.80 0.00
Income (Zip Code) 23704.06 23633.05 -71.01 2.39 0.02
Female 0.31 0.30 -0.01 6.27 0.00
White 0.64 0.64 -0.00 0.92 0.36
Black 0.28 0.28 -0.00 1.08 0.28
Asian 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.42 0.68
Hispanic 0.01 0.01 0.00 -4.63 0.00
First Offense 0.68 0.66 -0.02 11.21 0.00
covariate balance are also less convincing. Except for the proportions of Asians and Hispanics in the
sample, the differences are statistically significant but substantively small and more likely to reflect
the statistical power of the large sample rather than a violation of the underlying assumptions.
Still, as a precaution, I treat the traffic data as a supplemental source of results to the main effects
found in the criminal dataset.
Figure 2.4: Traffic Cases in Days Before and After Elections
−60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
Days from Election
To
ta
l C
as
es
h=0.05,\tn bins=120
2.4.2 Criminal Contact with the Police and Voting
Having provided evidence to justify the assumptions necessary for the regression discontinuity, I
now estimate the effects of contact with the police (i.e. being charged with a criminal offense). If, as
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Table 2.3: Covariate Balance in Traffic Data
Mean-Pre Mean-Post Difference Stat P(>|t|)
Age 35.19 35.58 0.39 -5.27 0.00
Income (Zip Code) 25159.09 25016.95 -142.14 3.13 0.00
Female 0.34 0.34 0.01 -3.81 0.00
White 0.70 0.71 0.00 -0.36 0.72
Black 0.17 0.17 0.00 -0.72 0.47
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.94 0.35
Hispanic 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.81 0.42
First Offense 0.69 0.69 -0.00 1.90 0.06
expected, contact reduces turnout, we should see a sharp jump between the average rates of voting
among defendants charged just before an election and those charged just after an election. In fact
this is exactly what we see in Figure 2.5, which shows the results from a quadratic regression using
all cases that occurred within 60 days of the past six general elections. Overall, the model predicts
that being stopped just before an election reduces turnout by 2.9 percentage points. Although three
percentage points may not seem like much, it is comparable to effect sizes seen in many GOTV
field experiments (Gerber and Green, 2000; Arceneaux, Gerber and Green, 2006), and while a few
thousand votes may not be enough to alter the course of a presidential election, it certainly could
sway local races for county sheriffs or judges. In short, simply being arrested and charged with
an offense directly shapes citizens’ behavior. Before trying to address the potential mechanisms
behind this result, I discuss a series of analyses that illustrate the robustness of this finding.
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Figure 2.5: Contact with Police Reduces Turnout
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To assess whether the estimated effect of contact with the criminal justice system is an artifact
of the model’s time frame or polynomial degree, I estimated a series of regressions varying both.
The results from estimating a total of 42 combinations are summarized in Figure 2.6. The y-axis
corresponds to the LATE from each model, which are plotted in increasing order of the model’s
polynomial degree. The colored lines show how the LATE varies for a given time frame, from 30
days before and after an election (red), to a full year (magenta), as I increase the polynomial order
of the regression from 0 (difference of means) to 6 degrees. The dots are placed at the estimate
(with bars representing the corresponding confidence intervals constructed from robust clustered
standard errors) from the model with the polynomial order that produces the best fit according a
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).
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Figure 2.6: Estimates are Robust to Numerous Specifications
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Several features are apparent from Figure 2.6. First, as Gelman and Imbens (2014) and others
have warned, the estimates from a regression discontinuity design are sensitive to how one chooses
to specify the model. We see effect sizes close to 8 percentage points for a 5th order polynomial
estimated over a 30-day window, and near 0 for models estimated using a full year window with
lower order polynomials. The former almost certainly over-fits the data, while the latter likely
under-fit the data, failing to account for seasonal variation in criminal charges. The measures of
goodness of fit agree. For narrow time frames, they select models with lower orders, while for longer
windows they favor models of higher degree, and the estimates from these models all tell a similar
story: Contact with the CJS reduces turnout by about 2 to 4 percentage points.
I present three further demonstrations of the robustness of this main result. First, if contact is
truly influencing defendants’ present voting behavior, then it should have no impact on their prior
behavior. Figure 2.7 suggests this is the case. Substituting the defendant’s voting behavior in the
election prior to their arrest, we see that the model is almost smooth at the cutoff, with an estimated
ρ of 0.0007 (p-value=0.36). Second, Figure 2.8 shows that effects are robust to pooling data across
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elections. With the exception of 2008, the effects are substantially larger (near 6 percentage points)
in general elections and smaller but still significant in mid-term elections (2-3 percentage points).
This makes sense if presidential elections bring in more marginal voters whose voting intentions
and behavior may be more influenced by unforeseen events, like being charged with an offense by
the police. Finally, Table 2.4 compares the point estimates, p-values, and 95% confidence intervals
from the quadratic regressions assuming continuity at the cutoff to those obtained from assuming
local randomization in 10-day and 5-day windows around the election.20 With the exception of
the estimates for 2014, and for the 10-day window 2008 and 2010, the substantive and statistical
results remain largely unchanged: contact reduces turnout by 2-4 percentage points.
Figure 2.7: Placebo Test: Present Contact Does Not Influence Past Voting Behavior
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20Estimates were obtained using the R implementation of rdlocrand (Cattaneo, Titiunik and Vazquez-Bare, 2015)
available online at https://sites.google.com/site/rdpackages/rdlocrand. Following (Cattaneo, Frandsen and
Titiunik, 2015), windows were chosen by comparing the balance on select covariates (age, income, offense history,
and indicator of white vs non-white) and choosing the smallest window with a minimum p-value above a threshold
of 0.15. As detailed in the appendix, with these data this procedure provides somewhat ambiguous results which
appear to depend on whether one chooses to de-trend the data or not (Sales and Hansen, 2014). The 10- and 5-day
windows represent a compromise between competing recommendations, but as the appendix shows the results are
robust to windows between 2 and 14 days, with smaller windows generally producing larger estimates.
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Figure 2.8: Yearly Estimates of the Effects of Criminal Contact on Voting
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Table 2.4: Summary of Main Effects
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Model Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
Pooled
All Elections 0.029 0.000 [0.027, 0.032] 0.015 0.000 [0.010, 0.020] 0.031 0.000 [0.024, 0.038]
Presidential 0.042 0.000 [0.038, 0.046] 0.022 0.000 [0.014, 0.030] 0.042 0.000 [0.032, 0.054]
Midterm 0.019 0.000 [0.017, 0.022] 0.011 0.001 [0.006, 0.016] 0.019 0.000 [0.012, 0.026]
Placebo 0.001 0.280 [-0.001, 0.003] -0.004 0.139 [-0.009, 0.001] -0.002 0.595 [-0.009, 0.005]
Yearly
2004 0.060 0.000 [0.056, 0.065] 0.048 0.000 [0.034, 0.060] 0.075 0.000 [0.056, 0.060]
2006 0.028 0.000 [0.024, 0.031] 0.017 0.002 [0.008, 0.028] 0.019 0.021 [0.006, 0.034]
2008 0.011 0.001 [0.004, 0.018] -0.007 0.405 [-0.010, 0.008] 0.025 0.022 [0.004, 0.046]
2010 0.018 0.000 [0.015, 0.021] 0.009 0.128 [-0.002, 0.018] 0.025 0.002 [0.010, 0.040]
2012 0.059 0.000 [0.055, 0.063] 0.031 0.000 [0.018, 0.046] 0.028 0.020 [0.008, 0.048]
2014 0.010 0.000 [0.007, 0.013] 0.006 0.238 [-0.002, 0.014] 0.012 0.059 [0.000, 0.022]
2.4.3 Conditional Effects of Contact
The results presented above have established that contact with the criminal justice system matters
for political participation. Identifying the mechanisms through which these experiences produce
these effects remains an open and more difficult question to answer. Below, I present a series
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of results estimated on subsets of the data to show how the effects of contact with the police
vary conditional on characteristics of the individual, the contact, and the context in which the
experience occurred. Collectively, these results help illustrate the multiple pathways–legal, material,
and psychological–through which contact with the criminal justice system can influence political
behavior. Throughout, the figures present results from quadratic regressions over a 60-day window,
and with tables comparing these estimates to those obtained from randomization inference using a
10- and 5-day windows around the election.
2.4.4 Race, Income, Age and Voting History
I begin by exploring how characteristics of individual defendants–their race, socio-economic status,
age, and prior voting history–condition the effects of their contact with the criminal justice system.
Given the disparate rates of contact of African Americans with the criminal justice system, both in
general and in this sample,21 we might expect that contact would have a particularly strong effect
among Black defendants. Figure 2.9 and Table 2.5 provide some evidence for this. Contact with
the police reduces turnout by a full percentage point more among Black defendants when compared
to White defendants. Still, these 3 and 4 percentage point estimates are comparable (and under
some alternative specifications even more similar). Even if Blacks and Whites respond to contact
with the police in a similar fashion, for Blacks this experience comes far more often and contributes
to the overall gaps in voting behavior seen across these two groups.22
21Approximately 66 percent of the criminal offenses and 76 percent of traffic offenses involve White defendants.
Blacks make up about 18 percent of the defendants in traffic cases and close to 30 percent of the defendants in
criminal cases. Given that Blacks make up about 9 percent of the population of Indiana, they are twice as likely to
be charged with a traffic offense and nearly three times as likely to be charged with a criminal offense.
22Somewhat unexpectedly, contact appears to be associated with increased levels of turnout among Asians and
Hispanics using regression estimates. The effects are non-significant using randomization inference; because these
groups make up less than 1.5 percent of the defendants, caution is clearly required in interpreting these results. While
these are interesting results, they would clearly need to be replicated, perhaps in a more racially diverse state, before
further conclusions could be drawn.
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Figure 2.9: Effects of Criminal Contact by Race
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Table 2.5: LATE by Race
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Race Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
White 0.028 0.000 [0.025, 0.031] 0.015 0.001 [0.008, 0.020] 0.034 0.000 [0.024, 0.042]
Black 0.039 0.000 [0.036, 0.042] 0.017 0.008 [0.006, 0.028] 0.034 0.001 [0.018, 0.052]
Asian -0.025 0.000 [-0.038, -0.011] -0.021 0.572 [-0.050, 0.040] -0.044 0.154 [-0.050, 0.000]
Hispanic -0.007 0.000 [-0.011, -0.003] -0.011 0.496 [-0.032, 0.010] -0.025 0.231 [-0.050, 0.010]
Next, I examine the impact of contact for people of different social-economic status–inferred
from the 2010 Census’ estimate of the median income in the ZIP code of their home address.
While an admittedly coarse measure of income, this analysis allows me to assess the extent to
which contact may influence behavior through material means. That is, if contact with police and
courts leads people to stop participating primarily because of the financial and material burden it
places on their lives, then we might expect that the effects of such contact should be larger for the
resource poor than the resource rich. Figure 2.10 and Table 2.6 suggests the story is complicated.
The largest effects of contact are found among those living in the ZIP codes corresponding to the
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first and third quartiles.23This suggests there multiple mechanisms may be at work. Among the
lower income quartiles, there may be a floor to the size of the effect. These groups are already
unlikely to vote, and the effects are largest among the poorest of the poor. Similarly, among the
higher income groups, it seems that at some point, a defendant’s resources provide some resiliency
against at least the material consequences of contact.24
Figure 2.10: Effects of Criminal Contact by Income
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Table 2.6: LATE by Income
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Income Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
1st Quartile 0.034 0.000 [0.032, 0.036] 0.022 0.000 [0.012, 0.030] 0.028 0.002 [0.014, 0.042]
2nd Quartile 0.022 0.000 [0.019, 0.025] 0.007 0.218 [-0.004, 0.016] 0.019 0.017 [0.004, 0.034]
3rd Quartile 0.038 0.000 [0.034, 0.041] 0.022 0.000 [0.012, 0.032] 0.042 0.000 [0.028, 0.056]
4th Quartile 0.026 0.000 [0.021, 0.031] 0.012 0.059 [0.000, 0.024] 0.034 0.001 [0.016, 0.052]
Finally, Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show that the effects of contact are larger among older voters
and people who voted in the last election. Given the habitual nature of voting, we should expect
23The pattern of results is the same when looking separately at Black and White defendants by income quartile.
24Of course, the types of contact these groups experience likely also varies, an issue I address directly in the next
section.
36
contact to have larger effects among these higher turnout groups, which is exactly what the figures
show. Contact decreases turnout by 7 percentage points among those who voted in the last election.
Among voters, the effects are indistinguishable between Whites and Blacks, but among Blacks who
did not vote in the last election, the effects of contact are more than a percentage point higher. As
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show, the same patterns hold under local randomization, although the effects
size are somewhat diminished, and, for Blacks who voted in the last election, no longer statistically
significant. Overall, this pattern of results suggests that contact may matter in different ways for
more marginal voters.. For Whites it may be a material constraint, while for Blacks there may be
the added burden of feeling systematically targeted by the justice system.
Figure 2.11: Effects of Criminal Contact by Age
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Table 2.7: LATE by age
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Age Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
1st Quartile 0.021 0.000 [0.018, 0.023] 0.012 0.012 [0.004, 0.020] 0.018 0.011 [0.006, 0.030]
2nd Quartile 0.009 0.000 [0.006, 0.012] 0.004 0.402 [-0.004, 0.014] 0.015 0.029 [0.002, 0.028]
3rd Quartile 0.038 0.000 [0.034, 0.041] 0.017 0.004 [0.006, 0.028] 0.040 0.000 [0.024, 0.056]
4th Quartile 0.048 0.000 [0.044, 0.052] 0.025 0.000 [0.012, 0.038] 0.047 0.000 [0.030, 0.060]
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Figure 2.12: Effects of Criminal Contact by Voting History
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Table 2.8: LATE by Voting History
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Voting History Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
Voted Last Election 0.066 0.000 [0.060, 0.073] 0.033 0.001 [0.014, 0.052] 0.060 0.000 [0.032, 0.060]
No Vote in LE 0.023 0.000 [0.021, 0.025] 0.014 0.000 [0.010, 0.018] 0.027 0.000 [0.020, 0.032]
VLE: White 0.061 0.000 [0.052, 0.069] 0.031 0.032 [0.006, 0.056] 0.077 0.000 [0.040, 0.060]
VLE: Black 0.065 0.000 [0.057, 0.073] 0.031 0.098 [-0.006, 0.060] 0.039 0.152 [-0.010, 0.060]
NVLE: White 0.020 0.000 [0.018, 0.023] 0.013 0.000 [0.008, 0.018] 0.025 0.000 [0.016, 0.034]
NVLE: Black 0.037 0.000 [0.034, 0.041] 0.019 0.002 [0.008, 0.030] 0.040 0.000 [0.024, 0.056]
2.4.5 Characteristics of Contact
Having shown how different people respond to contact, I now explore how the effect of being charged
with an offense varies by the type of experience. First, I explore some logical implications of how
variation in the nature of this experience should influence voting. Specifically, I expect that the
more severe the crime, the larger the effect, since, in the extreme, someone charged with murder
will likely be held without bail and thus physically prevented from voting in an election. Then, I
consider the consequences of being charged with an offense that was ultimately dismissed. Such
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experiences may be particularly demobilizing from a psychological perspective, suggesting that the
criminal justice system, and government more broadly, is flawed and biased against that person.
Second, I explore the consequences of multiple interactions with the criminal justice system. If,
as Lerman and Weaver (2014) and others have suggested, contact is a socializing experience, we
should expect individuals with more frequent levels of contact to participate at lower rates such
that the effects of early experiences may be larger than later incidents as individuals withdraw from
political life.
2.4.6 Contact and the Severity and Outcome of the Charge
Figure 2.13 examines how the effect of contact varies with severity of the charge. We see that for
misdemeanors through Class D (e.g. battery) and Class C (e.g. theft) felonies produce about a
2 to 2.5 percentage point decrease in turnout. In comparison Class A felonies (e.g. rape, assault
with a deadly weapon) produce close to a 10 percentage point decrease in turnout.25 Interestingly,
individuals charged with an infraction (an offense that doesn’t involve jail time such as walking
one’s dog without leash), are actually more likely to participate, by about 2.5 percentage points.
Although these cases represent less than half of a percent of all cases, they suggest that in some
rare instances, contact with the criminal justice system may actually be a mobilizing experience.
As Table 2.9 shows, the general pattern of these effects is replicated assuming local randomization,
although the effects of infractions and some less severe felonies (both relatively rare cases) are
non-significant depending on the window of days in which they are estimated.
25Murders are treated separately in Indiana sentencing law but are coded with Class A felonies in this
analysis. For a brief overview of Indiana sentencing law see Ave Mince-Didier, “Indiana Felony Crimes by
Class and Sentences” Criminal Defense Lawyer, online at http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/
criminal-defense/felony-offense/indiana-felony-class.htm.
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Figure 2.13: Effects of Contact increase with the Severity of Crime
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Table 2.9: LATE by Severity of Offense
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Offense History Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
Infraction -0.025 0.001 [-0.040, -0.011] -0.023 0.623 [-0.030, 0.050] -0.051 0.442 [-0.030, 0.050]
Misdemeanor 0.021 0.000 [0.019, 0.024] 0.020 0.000 [0.014, 0.028] 0.022 0.000 [0.010, 0.032]
Felony D 0.026 0.000 [0.023, 0.028] 0.020 0.005 [0.008, 0.030] 0.019 0.039 [0.002, 0.034]
Felony C 0.014 0.000 [0.011, 0.017] 0.015 0.314 [-0.010, 0.042] 0.023 0.319 [-0.010, 0.060]
Felony B 0.043 0.000 [0.039, 0.048] 0.032 0.029 [0.002, 0.058] 0.028 0.182 [-0.010, 0.060]
Felony A 0.097 0.000 [0.088, 0.106] 0.080 0.004 [0.024, 0.136] 0.077 0.070 [-0.006, 0.150]
To explore this issue further, I examined whether the effects of contact varied based on whether
the case was ultimately dismissed–about 18 percent of total cases. We might expect such cases
to be potentially mobilizing, if defendants feel they’ve been wrongfully charged and decide to do
something about it. Alternatively these experiences may be particularly demobilizing in ways
described by Lerman and Weaver (2014)–leading defendants to feel the system is stacked against
them. The results, presented in Figure 2.14, provide no evidence of mobilization. Instead, cases
that were dismissed appear to be particularly demobilizing and this effect seems to be driven largely
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by the responses of Black defendants, who are about 6.5 percentage points less likely to vote.26
This provides further evidence that while the material consequences of contact across races are the
same, Blacks may bear an additional psychological costs from contact with the police.
Figure 2.14: Charges that are Dismissed are Particularly Demobilizing
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Table 2.10: LATE by Outcome of Case
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Offense History Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
Dismissed 0.047 0.000 [0.044, 0.050] 0.034 0.000 [0.022, 0.046] 0.053 0.000 [0.036, 0.060]
Not Dismissed 0.026 0.000 [0.023, 0.029] 0.011 0.000 [0.006, 0.016] 0.026 0.000 [0.018, 0.034]
Dis: White 0.029 0.000 [0.026, 0.033] 0.022 0.007 [0.008, 0.038] 0.035 0.006 [0.012, 0.056]
Dis: Black 0.064 0.000 [0.060, 0.069] 0.046 0.000 [0.024, 0.060] 0.081 0.000 [0.046, 0.060]
Not Dis: White 0.027 0.000 [0.023, 0.031] 0.012 0.007 [0.006, 0.020] 0.032 0.000 [0.020, 0.044]
Not Dis: Black 0.030 0.000 [0.026, 0.034] 0.007 0.368 [-0.008, 0.020] 0.019 0.068 [0.000, 0.038]
26Table 2.10 shows that these effects are generally robust to different identifying assumptions and identification
strategies, although among Blacks whose cases were not dismissed, are smaller and, insignificant using a 10-day
window.
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2.4.7 The Consequences of Multiple Interactions with the Police
The analysis so far has treated each case as an independent observation. In fact, based on names and
dates of birth, about 16 percent of the defendants in criminal (n=378,303) and traffic (n=613,885)
cases appear in the dataset more than once. From a policy feedback perspective, we should ex-
pect that repeated experiences with the police and courts will be associated with declining rates of
participation. Figure 2.15 shows just such a pattern. Turnout falls from 17.6 percent among defen-
dants charged with their first offense to 4.2 percent charged with their 20th offense. Furthermore,
the pattern of decline is similar across racial groups, although slightly steeper for Whites.
Figure 2.15: Turnout Decreases of With Multiple Criminal Offenses
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If repeated contact is associated with a general withdrawal from politics, then we should expect
the initial experience to weigh more heavily then subsequent interactions. Someone being charged
for the 20th time is very unlikely to vote in the first place, and so relative to an individual’s first
encounter, subsequent experiences may have a diminished or null effect on voting. Figure 2.16
provides support for these expectations. Each panel shows 1) the effects of a defendant’s first expe-
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rience (red) 2) the effect of that experience among defendants who will be charged with subsequent
offenses and 3) the effect of contact occurring after a defendant’s first charge, for the entire sample,
and then for White and Blacks separately. A defendant’s first charge reduces turnout by about
3.4 percentage points overall and by about 4.6 percentage points among blacks. Among defen-
dants who will go on to be charged with subsequent offenses, the effects of that first experience
are comparable. As Table 2.11 shows, after defendant’s initial experiences, the effects of contact
are greatly diminished and, assuming local randomization within a 10-day window, insignificant for
both Whites and Blacks
Figure 2.16: Effects of Contact Decrease with Multiple Offenses
Total White Black
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
F FoM NF F FoM NF F FoM NF
Offense
LA
TE
Offense
First
First of Multiple
Not First
LATE by Offense History 
(2nd Order Polynomial)
Next, I examine these dynamics using the traffic case data. Since very few traffic cases result in
defendants serving jail time, the physical and legal mechanisms that would decrease turnout may
be less important than the affective and psychological effects of these experiences. This may be
particularly true for Blacks, who Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2014) show are not only
stopped at disproportionate rates but also tend to experience stops initiated not for traffic safety
reasons but for investigative policing. Such pre-textual stops may be particularly demobilizing.
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Table 2.11: LATE for Criminal Offense History
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Criminal Offense History Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
First Offense 0.034 0.000 [0.031, 0.037] 0.018 0.000 [0.012, 0.024] 0.032 0.000 [0.024, 0.042]
First of Multiple 0.032 0.000 [0.029, 0.034] 0.023 0.000 [0.010, 0.034] 0.042 0.000 [0.024, 0.060]
Not First 0.017 0.000 [0.014, 0.019] 0.008 0.076 [0.002, 0.016] 0.025 0.000 [0.014, 0.036]
FO: White 0.032 0.000 [0.028, 0.036] 0.017 0.000 [0.008, 0.026] 0.036 0.000 [0.024, 0.050]
FoM: White 0.029 0.000 [0.025, 0.033] 0.026 0.003 [0.010, 0.042] 0.044 0.000 [0.018, 0.060]
NF: White 0.027 0.000 [0.024, 0.031] 0.010 0.276 [-0.006, 0.028] 0.027 0.031 [0.004, 0.050]
FO: Black 0.046 0.000 [0.043, 0.050] 0.023 0.010 [0.006, 0.038] 0.039 0.001 [0.016, 0.060]
FoM: Black 0.040 0.000 [0.035, 0.046] 0.018 0.243 [-0.010, 0.044] 0.058 0.004 [0.018, 0.060]
NF: Black 0.027 0.000 [0.024, 0.031] 0.010 0.276 [-0.006, 0.028] 0.027 0.031 [0.004, 0.050]
Figure 2.17 shows the estimates for the entire sample. Being charged with an offense during a
traffic stop leads to 1.7 percentage point decrease in turnout. Figure 2.18 shows that responses of
Black and White defendants to these experiences appears similar.27 Figures 2.19 and 2.20, however,
suggested a more complicated story. As Figures 2.19 shows, in the aggregate, repeated traffic
offenses are associated with decreased rates of voting. Although the trend is steadily downward
for Whites, only at the extremes do Blacks charged with multiple offenses appear to vote at lower
rates. Looking at the effects of repeated interactions in Figure 2.20, we also see a different pattern
of results than those shown in Figure 2.16 for criminal cases. While the effects of contact are
small and diminishing among Whites, among Blacks who have been stopped by the police seven or
more times, these repeated experience reduce turnout by over 10 percentage points. These cases
represent a very small fraction of total cases, but these demobilizing events are consistent with the
claims of Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2014) and, as I discuss in the conclusion, may
have consequences beyond those directly involved.
27Again the positive response of Asians in the sample is surprising and tempered by the relatively few cases Asian
defendants in the sample overall.
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Figure 2.17: Contact with Police from Traffic Violations Reduces Turnout
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Figure 2.18: Overall Effects for Traffic Violations Similar Across Race
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Figure 2.19: Turnout Decreases of With Multiple Traffic Offenses
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Figure 2.20: Effects of Multiple Traffic Violations Differ Across Race
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Table 2.12: LATE for Traffic Offense
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Traffic Offense Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
Pooled 0.011 0.000 [0.009, 0.013] 0.006 0.035 [0.002, 0.010] 0.010 0.010 [0.004, 0.016]
White 0.012 0.000 [0.009, 0.015] 0.005 0.132 [0.000, 0.010] 0.009 0.055 [0.000, 0.018]
Black 0.011 0.000 [0.008, 0.014] 0.009 0.202 [-0.004, 0.022] 0.016 0.136 [-0.002, 0.034]
Asian -0.043 0.000 [-0.052, -0.035] -0.015 0.595 [-0.010, 0.024] -0.031 0.422 [-0.010, 0.028]
Hispanic 0.022 0.000 [0.014, 0.030] -0.008 0.746 [-0.010, 0.034] 0.039 0.210 [-0.010, 0.060]
Table 2.13: LATE for Traffic Offense History
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Traffic Offense History Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
First Offense 0.012 0.000 [0.009, 0.014] 0.007 0.023 [0.002, 0.014] 0.012 0.011 [0.002, 0.020]
First of Multiple 0.010 0.000 [0.006, 0.014] 0.012 0.089 [0.000, 0.024] 0.020 0.038 [0.002, 0.038]
Not First 0.009 0.000 [0.006, 0.012] 0.004 0.442 [-0.004, 0.012] 0.005 0.459 [-0.008, 0.018]
Seven + 0.040 0.000 [0.026, 0.054] 0.017 0.424 [-0.010, 0.058] 0.087 0.004 [0.022, 0.060]
FO: White 0.012 0.000 [0.009, 0.015] 0.005 0.208 [-0.002, 0.012] 0.012 0.068 [0.000, 0.022]
FoM: White 0.000 0.887 [-0.004, 0.005] 0.002 0.790 [-0.010, 0.018] 0.015 0.197 [-0.006, 0.038]
NF: White 0.014 0.000 [0.011, 0.016] 0.007 0.230 [-0.004, 0.018] 0.003 0.773 [-0.010, 0.020]
7+: White -0.010 0.155 [-0.023, 0.004] -0.015 0.575 [-0.010, 0.032] 0.035 0.389 [-0.010, 0.060]
FO: Black 0.010 0.000 [0.007, 0.013] 0.012 0.193 [-0.004, 0.030] 0.016 0.203 [-0.008, 0.042]
FoM: Black 0.040 0.000 [0.034, 0.045] 0.034 0.032 [0.004, 0.060] 0.035 0.121 [-0.010, 0.060]
NF: Black 0.012 0.000 [0.006, 0.017] 0.005 0.690 [-0.010, 0.024] 0.014 0.363 [-0.010, 0.044]
7+: Black 0.113 0.000 [0.091, 0.136] 0.057 0.217 [-0.010, 0.060] 0.140 0.035 [0.008, 0.060]
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2.4.8 Context of Contact
Finally, I examine the extent to which the effects of contact vary by characteristics of both the
individual and context in which the contact occurs. Figure 2.21 compares the effects of criminal
contact that occurred within Indianapolis and Marion County to contact that occurred outside
this large metropolitan region. Overall the estimates are similar both in the aggregate and across
racial groups. The lack of differences may reflect a truly uniform effect in Indiana, or may simply
reflect the need for more nuanced measures of contextual variation, such as the racial composition
of populations and arrests in a particular area.
Figure 2.21: Little Variation in Effects Across Context and Race
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Table 2.14: LATE by Context of Offense
2nd Order Polynomial Randomization Inference
60-Day Window 10-Day Window 5-Day Window
Offense History Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI Estimate P > |T | 95% CI
Marion Cnty 0.026 0.000 [0.023, 0.029] 0.008 0.116 [-0.002, 0.018] 0.026 0.000 [0.012, 0.040]
Not Marion Cnty 0.028 0.000 [0.026, 0.030] 0.017 0.000 [0.012, 0.022] 0.028 0.000 [0.020, 0.036]
MC: White 0.025 0.000 [0.021, 0.029] 0.011 0.150 [-0.002, 0.026] 0.035 0.000 [0.014, 0.054]
MC: Black 0.038 0.000 [0.034, 0.041] 0.012 0.161 [-0.004, 0.028] 0.027 0.034 [0.006, 0.050]
Not MC: White 0.028 0.000 [0.024, 0.031] 0.016 0.000 [0.006, 0.024] 0.030 0.000 [0.018, 0.042]
Not MC: Black 0.036 0.000 [0.032, 0.039] 0.026 0.004 [0.010, 0.040] 0.038 0.001 [0.016, 0.058]
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2.5 Conclusion
Citizens’ involuntary contact with the criminal justice system has democratic consequences. Using
a unique dataset of official records of both criminal contact and voting from Indiana, I show that
such experiences reduce turnout by 2-4 percentage points. When aggregated across counties and
states, they represent a large body of citizens whose voices are not represented at the ballot.
By examining how the effects of such contact vary according to characteristics of the defendant,
the experience, and the context, I also shed light onto some of the mechanisms through which
these experiences shape behavior. A portion of these effects appears to be due to the material and
physical consequences of these experiences, to which most citizens appear to respond similarly. Yet,
I also find evidence that Blacks may bear additional non-material or psychological costs from these
experiences, which is consistent with the larger theoretical frameworks put forward by Lerman,
Weaver and others. Combined with the disparate rates of contact, these dynamics almost certainly
broaden the gaps in participation and representation of Blacks and Whites.
By themselves, these robust results are important, but they mark only the beginning of what
can be done with these types of data and designs. Future research can explore the extent to which
these effects have longer downstream consequences both for the individuals directly involved, and
for those closest to them. For example, among Blacks that are repeatedly pulled over by police, the
effects of such contact are dramatically negative. And while a tiny fraction of defendants actually
experience such treatment, it seems likely that the impact of their experiences is not limited to
their own political behavior and attitudes, but may also influence the attitudes of their friends and
family. Studying the potential “spillover effects” of these experiences represents one of the many
important extensions of this work.
More broadly, this type of design can applied to a number of contexts and behaviors outside
the criminal justice system and voting to provide further insights into the way individuals’ unique
experiences shape their political behavior. Finally, from a normative perspective, these findings
suggest that small changes that reduce either the overall incidence of contact or even just the
disparity in rates of contact could facilitate the creation of broader constituencies for criminal
justice reform.
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Chapter 3
What’s Race Got to Do With It?
3.1 Introduction
On August 9th, 2014, Michael Brown, an 18-year-old black man from Ferguson, MO, was shot
and killed by a White police officer. The event set off weeks of protest bringing national attention
to a larger, ongoing debate about race and justice in America. By chance, a survey fielded in
the weeks before and after the shooting asked respondents to what extent they agreed Blacks and
other minorities received equal treatment in the criminal justice system. Just under 30 percent of
minority respondents agreed with the statement before the shooting, and only 13 percent agreed
with the claim in the days after the shooting. Among White respondents however, there was only
a small change, in the opposite direction: the percent agreeing actually increased from 44 to 48
percent.1
How is it that two groups in society respond so differently to the same event? The answer
lies in the complex nature and meaning of justice in America. By now, it is well established that
Whites and minorities hold disparate views of relative fairness and legitimacy of the criminal justice
system in the U.S. (Peﬄey and Hurwitz, 2010; Hurwitz and Peﬄey, 2005a; Sigelman and Welsh,
1991; Bobo and Charles, 2009). In short, Whites tend to view the system as generally fair and just.
Minorities do not. These gaps in beliefs are a product, in part, of the disparate experiences of these
groups with the police, courts, and prisons. Simply put, at virtually every stage of legal process
1See Public Religion Research Institute, “Race, the Criminal Justice System, and Police” http://publicreligion.
org/research/2014/11/prri-fact-sheet-race-the-criminal-justice-system-and-police/#.Vxi1bJMrJIY
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from contact and arrests to sentencing and incarceration, minorities, the poor, and in particular,
poor minorities, fair worse than their peers (Western and Wildeman, 2009; Western, 2006; Spohn,
2013). As such, not only do Whites and minorities differ in their relative evaluations of justice in
America and the fairness of its legal institutions, but they also differ in how they interpret and
apply these beliefs in their evaluations of specific policies and events. For minorities, fairness beliefs
are closely linked to their relative treatment of their racial group. For Whites, however, perceptions
of systemic fairness appear decoupled from the issue of race. Indeed, Hurwitz and Peﬄey (2005a)
find that even Whites who perceive the overall system to be less than fair are unlikely to perceive
racial bias in settings where such bias is likely to occur.
If some groups in society see events like Ferguson as a call to action, while other groups sees the
same incident as an aberration, addressing issues in our criminal justice system may prove difficult.
Finding a common ground to discuss disparities and reform requires a deeper understanding of
what different racial groups think about justice and inequality, and how general beliefs come to
shape specific reactions. I contribute to our understanding of these dynamics in three ways. First,
with a unique dataset from the state of Washington with an oversample of racial minorities, I
replicate the design of Hurwitz and Peﬄey (2005a). By moving beyond a consideration of just the
Black-White divide in justice beliefs to also examine the attitudes and perceptions of Hispanics
and Asians, I provide a more complete view of how citizens in an increasingly multi-racial society
perceive fairness and racial bias in the criminal justice system. Next, I explore the question of
whether Whites will ever perceive racial bias in citizens’ interactions with the police. First, using
the Washington data, I examine whether even Whites who acknowledge systemic differences in the
relative treatment of Blacks and Whites perceive racial bias in the treatment of suspects in a survey
experiment. Finally, using a second survey experiment manipulating the race of drivers during a
hypothetical traffic stop, I examine the role of Whites’ fairness beliefs in the perception of injustice
in a less explicitly criminal scenario.
Overall, I find that perceptions of injustice vary markedly by race and context. Whites’ percep-
tions of racial bias depend on the both the nature of the incident and their general beleifs about
the relative fairness of the system. During an explicitly criminal interaction, even Whites who ac-
knowledge injustices at a systemic level appear unlikely to percieve racial biases in a specific case.
In more ambiguous situations, fairness beliefs prove to be a strong predictor of the extent to which
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Whites see bias in how police treat Blacks. Racial minorities, in contrast, percieve racial bias more
readily, but perceptions of systemic fairness appear to function differently for Blacks, Hispanics,
and Asians. Combined, these results have important implications for how we think and talk about
the issue of criminal justice reform.
3.2 When, Why, and for Whom Fairness Matters in the Criminal Justice
System
The public response to the events in Ferguson, MO illustrates a stark racial divide in how justice is
both perceived and experienced in America. Two aspects of this divide are particularly important.
First, Whites and racial minorities hold very different beliefs about the general fairness of the
criminal system. Second, these fairness beliefs appear to function in very different ways when
different racial groups make evaluations of the criminal justice system. Together, these features
raise important questions about who perceives injustice and what they may be willing to do about
it.
On the first point, numerous studies using various measures consistently find that Whites possess
more positive attitudes toward the criminal justice system than do minorities, and in particular,
Blacks. For example, in their 2001 Race, Crime, and Public Opinion Study, Bobo and Johnson
(2002) find that 89 percent of African Americans believe the the criminal justice system is biased
against Blacks, compared to just 38 percent of Whites.2 Explanations for the origins of these gaps
begin by noting the disparate experiences of different racial groups with the criminal justice system.
In short, for some racial minorities, contact with the police, courts, and prison is far more common
and often far less just than for Whites (Western and Wildeman, 2009; Western, 2006; Spohn, 2013;
Tonry, 1995). Although racial and ethnic minorities make up about 40 percent of the population
in the U.S., they account for over 60 percent of those currently incarcerated in jails and prisons.3
Furthermore, while studies suggest that Blacks use illicit drugs at rates comparable to those found
in other racial groups (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2013), Blacks
2See also Unnever and Cullen (2007a,b); Unnever, Cullen and Jonson (2008)
3See “Racial Disparity”, The Sentencing Project, Retrieved from http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/
page.cfm?id=122
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account for over 30 percent of arrests and over 40 percent of incarcerations for drug law violations.4
Overall, Blacks are arrested nearly three times more often than are members of other races.5
The effect of the divergent experiences of Whites and minorities is further magnified through
social interactions and the media. Rosenbaum et al. (2005) show that even without personal
encounters with the police, hearing about negative experiences through the one’s friends and family
leads to more negative evaluations of the police. Mondak et al. (n.d.) show that this vicarious
information affects people similarly in the sense that individuals from all racial and ethnic groups
factor in their acquaintances’ experiences when evaluating police and courts. However, homophily
combined with racial disparities in the nature of these experiences serves to widen the perceptual
gaps between Whites and Blacks. Similarly, through interviews with young Black men in St Louis,
MO, Brunson explores how the sharing of stories leads these men to conclude that “police don’t like
black people” Brunson (2007) and how these beliefs are transmitted across generations (Brunson
and Weitzer, 2011). The media also play a role, reinforcing stereotypes about the nature and
causes of crime. Jamieson (1993) finds a disproportionate number of stories about Blacks relate
to crime and Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) find blacks are overrepresented as perpetrators of violent
crime. In turn, Whites are more likely to attribute crime and racial disparities in criminal justice to
individualistic and dispositional factors (e.g. “People turn to crime because they are lazy”), while
Blacks and other minorities tend to give greater weight to more systemic explanations like poverty
and lack of jobs Bobo and Thompson (2006); Peﬄey and Hurwitz (2010).
Whites and minorities differ then not only in the extent to which they think the system is fair,
but also what fairness means to them. A large body of literature suggests that fairness evaluations
are as much about the process as the outcome both in general and specifically in relation to criminal
justice (Tyler and Jackson, 2014; Tyler, 2006; Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler and Folger, 1980). While
overall, Posick, Rocque and McDevitt (2013) find that many of the components of procedural
justice operate similarly across racial groups, they note that items measuring the objectivity of the
police appear to function differently for Blacks than whites. Specifically, they find that “Blacks
may have a tougher time believing that the police are objective even if they have similar attitudes
as Whites toward their encounter with the police” (Posick, Rocque and McDevitt, 2013, p. 204).
4See “The Drug War, Mass Incarceration and Race”, Drug Policy Alliance, (2015, 12 June), Retrieved from:
http://www.drugpolicy.org/resource/drug-war-mass-incarceration-and-race
5See Heath, Brady (2014, November 14). Racial gaps in U.S. arrest rates: ‘Staggering disparity’. USA Today.
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Similarly, Taylor, Wyant and Lockwood (2015) find that perceived effectiveness of police has a
stronger impact on the perceived fairness of police among Non-Whites than Whites.
Hurwitz and Peﬄey (2005b) provide a dramatic example of how fairness beliefs operate differ-
ently among Blacks and Whites. Using two survey experiments designed to capture the possibility
of racial bias in policing, they manipulate whether victims of police brutality and the suspects in a
stop-and-search by the police were White or Black. While they find that beliefs about the general
fairness of the police condition interpretations of the events for both Blacks and Whites, they do
so in different ways. Blacks view the relative justness of these interactions explicitly through the
lens of race. Blacks who think the police are generally unfair perceive large gaps in the relative
treatment of victims and suspects based on their race. In both conditions, Blacks view the suspects
and victims as being treated more poorly when they are Black than when they are White. In
contrast, Whites’ views of the overall fairness of the criminal justice system have no effect on their
propensity to perceive racial bias in these interactions. Whites who think the police treat people
unfairly in general think both suspects are treated poorly, but perceive no difference in the relative
treatment based on victims’ and suspects’ race.
Collectively, existing research suggests that the answer to the question of who perceives injustice
is “it depends.” More specifically, evaluations of interactions with the criminal justice system are
a function of the race of those involved, the race of those evaluating, and the conditional meaning
of fairness and justice to members of that racial group. Yet, our understanding of these complex
dynamics is incomplete in at least two ways. First, the bulk of research has focused on the attitudes
and beliefs of Blacks and Whites in America (Weitzer, 2014). Yet over a quarter of Americans
identify as neither and the share of the population that identify as Hispanic or Asian is projected
to rise dramatically in the coming decades Colby and Ortman (2015). Second, ambiguity of the
scenarios presented in Hurwitz and Peﬄey (2005b) may lead us to question the extent of Whites’
potential colorblindness to racial biases in the criminal justice system.
Existing theory provides guidance to both of these questions. With regard to perceptions of
injustice and racial bias by groups other than Blacks and Whites, work by Hurwitz, Peﬄey and
Mondak (2015) suggests a degree of inter-group empathy.6 To the extent that Hispanics experience
similar disparities as Blacks in their interactions with the criminal justice system, they may be
6See also Unnever and Cullen (2009); Unnever, Cullen and Fisher (2005)
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more likely to recognize injustice compared to Whites and Asians (Weitzer, 2014). With regard to
Whites’ ability to perceive injustice, several factors may be at play. First, given Whites relative
position and treatment by the criminal justice system, the failure of Whites to perceive racial bias
during interactions with the police may reflect a need to justify the prevailing social order (Jost,
Banaji and Nosek, 2004; Jost and Burgess, 2000; Jost and Banaji, 1994). If so, Whites’ beliefs in a
colorblind criminal justice system may be relatively widespread and entrenched. Alternatively, the
lack of perceived bias in a specific interaction may be more a product of the complex relationship
between Whites’ attitudes about race and crime, rather than in a general ability to acknowledge
racial disparities in the criminal justice system. Just as Whites have become less likely to agree
with specific measures of “old-fashioned racism,” they may be less willing to link their overall
evaluations of the criminal justice system to the specific treatment of different racial groups (Tesler,
2016; Feldman and Huddy, 2005; Henry and Sears, 2002; Sears et al., 1997). Asking Whites about
their beliefs regarding the general fairness of the police and courts may conflate those who recognize
systemic racial disparities with those who think the system is personally unfair or believe existing
inequalities are due to socio-economic factors that cross racial lines. If so, then a more direct
measure asking respondents explicitly about the relative treatment of Blacks and Whites by the
police should do a better job of predicting perceptions of racial bias. Similarly the scenarios
presented by Hurwitz, Peﬄey and Mondak (2015) may tap prevailing stereotypes about race, class,
and crime. In other settings, Whites’ perceptions of fairness may play a larger role in conditioning
their perceptions of racial bias and injustice.
3.3 Data and Design
To explore the potential of citizens to perceive racial bias in the criminal justice system, I examine
two survey experiments that manipulate the race of suspects during hypothetical interactions with
the police. By randomizing the race of the suspects, I hold constant the nature of the interaction
and can attribute differences in interpretation of these events to characteristics and beliefs of the
respondents evaluating this encounter. Specifically, this design allows me to explore whether differ-
ences between Whites and other minorities in how they assess the situations are due to differences
in general beliefs about the fairness of the police, or differences in how these beliefs condition their
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interpretation of events.
The first experiment replicates the stop-search experiment discussed in Hurwitz and Peﬄey
(2005b) and Peﬄey and Hurwitz (2010) using data from the Justice in Washington State Survey,
an internet survey administered by YouGov between June 14 and July 2, 2012. Respondents were
presented with the following scenario:
In another incident, the police see two young [African-American/White] men about 20
years old. They are walking very near a house where the police know drugs are being
sold. The police search the two men and arrest them for carrying drugs.
Respondents were then asked to evaluate the scenario along two dimensions using two six-point
scales. First, whether they thought the search was reasonable (0=Definitely a reasonable search,
5=Definitely NOT a reasonable search), and second, whose version of the events they were more
likely to believe: the police, who claim the two men were carrying drugs (coded as 5) or the men,
who claim the police planted drugs on them (code as 0).
The Washington Survey has several advantages that allow me to expand and refine the initial
findings of Hurwitz and Peﬄey (2005b). First, the survey was specifically designed to study the
perceptions and experiences of different racial groups with the criminal justice system in Wash-
ington, and contains an oversample of racial and ethnic minorities (302 Latinos, 287 Blacks, and
320 Asians) in addition to 605 White respondents.7 This oversample of racial minorities allows
me to explore the understudied attitudes of Hispanics and Asians, two groups whose views have
been neglected given their growing representation in the population (Weitzer, 2014; Oliver, 2010).
Even if Whites generally fail to perceive racial bias in these interactions, Asians, and, particularly,
Hispanics, may be more attuned to the potential for police to treat suspects differently based on
their race.
Second, the Washington survey contains specific measures of police fairness as opposed to
the more general measures of fairness in the criminal justice system used by Hurwitz and Peﬄey
(2005b). Specifically, respondents were asked to evaluate police fairness along two dimensions based
on how often they thought the police treated citizens fairly and with respect (1=Never, 6=Always).
7The survey is not designed to provide a representative sample of Washington State, but all survey responses
are weighted within racial groups to approximate Census estimates the demographic characteristics of these groups
within Washington state
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The two items were highly correlated (r=0.69) and, following Hurwitz and Peﬄey (2005b), averaged
together to provide a single measure of respondents’ perceptions of the systemic fairness of the police
(mean=3.4, sd=1.09). Given that citizens may hold different beliefs about the relative fairness of
the police and courts, focusing specifically on evaluations of the police may provide a cleaner test
of the possibility for different people to perceive injustice and racial bias. Third, to provide an
even more direct test of the ability of Whites and other groups to perceive racial biases in the
criminal justice system, I construct a measure that explicitly captures captures respondents’ stated
perceptions of racial differences in the treatment of Blacks and Whites by the police. Specifically,
respondents were asked what percent of the time they felt the justice system treated Whites and
Blacks fairly (0=Never, 100=Always). The difference between these measures provides an explicit
measure of the perceived racial bias of the justice system. Negative values indicate someone thinks
the police treat Whites more fairly than Blacks and positive values imply someone thinks the police
treat Blacks more fairly than Whites (mean=-36.14, sd=32.59).8 If even with this measure, Whites
refuse to perceive racial bias, then perhaps Whites truly are colorblind in their evaluations of the
justice system.
As Hurwitz and Peﬄey (2005b, p. 777) note in their original study, the stop-and-search experi-
ment places the suspects in “a context [that] may be interpreted by some to imply the guilt of the
civilians, while for others it may suggest the familiar scenario of racial profiling.” To explore the
potential of Whites to perceive racial bias in more mundane, everyday interaction with the police, I
conducted a second survey experiment using the undergraduate subject pool of a large Midwestern
University.9 Using a two-by-two design, I varied the race of the driver and the reason they were
stopped in the following scenario:
Anthony, pictured below [White/Black], is an assistant professor at the university. Re-
cently while driving home from work, he was pulled over by the [local] police for [speed-
ing/failing to use a turn signal].
8Whites percieve the smallest gap (mean=-25.08,sd=29.64), followed by Asians (mean=-34.48, sd=29.92) and
Hispanics (mean=-41.87, sd= 32.99). Blacks, contrast, perceive a gap more than twice as large as Whites (mean=-
56.25, sd=30.49)
9The experiment contained a total of 236 respondents. The majority of respondents identified as White (156),
while 37 identified as primarily Asian, 11 as Black, and 12 as Hispanic (Responents could identify as multiple races).
For clarity, only respondents who identified as White are used in the analysis below as there are too few minorities
to conduct meaningful sub-group analysis with this sample.
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The design differs from the Hurwitz and Peﬄey (2005b) in several key factors. First, the in-
teraction, a traffic stop, is a far more common situation than a drug search and it is one which
respondents may be able to relate to either through personal or vicarious experience.10 Second,
while the stop-and-search experiment Hurwitz and Peﬄey concerned a potentially serious crimi-
nal charge, the traffic stop involves a more ambiguous situation where respondents may question
whether the driver really deserved or needed to be pulled over. Furthermore, we know from work
by Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2014) that traffic stops may be used for investigative
policing that disproportionately targets minority drivers.
Third, as Hurwitz and Peﬄey note, subjects are likely to draw inferences about the guilt of
the suspects based on the described scenario (e.g. walking in a neighborhood). In this traffic stop
experiment, the context is more neutral, and the only features of the drivers that should matter are
race and, potentially, their driving behavior.11 Maninpulating both the driver’s race and reason
for stop then allows me to assess whether White respondents will perceive disparate treatment
in two scenarios where objective evidence and danger of an offense may be strong (speeding) or
weak (failing to use a turn signal). Respondents were then asked to evaluate the interaction along
a number dimensions. First, did they think Anthony would be given a ticket and fine or just a
written warning? Second, did they think Anthony deserved to be pulled over? Finally, subjects
were asked to evaluate how likely was it that Anthony broke the law, and whether he would win
his case if he contested it in court using six point scales (0=Very unlikely, 6=Very likely). For
each condition, I examine aggregate differences across treatment groups and then explore how
respondents’ evaluations vary conditionally on their perceptions of the systemic fairness of the
police measured by taking the average of five five-point scales asking respondents the extent to
which they agreed or disagreed with statements like “Police are concerned about respecting a
citizen’s individual rights” (mean=2.93, sd=0.41, α=0.67)12.
10According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics most recent Police-Public Contact Survey, in 2011 about one in
four Americans over the age of 16 had one or more contacts with the police in the past year. Of these 63 million
incidents, about half were voluntary, involving calls for service, accidents, and crime prevention programs. Of the
remaining cases of involuntary contact, about 85 percent came from traffic stops, five percent from street stops and
10 percent from other arrests (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011; Langton et al., 2013).
11That is, respondents are unlikely to think their driver was pulled over because he was an assistant professor,
while in the stop and search experiment, they might draw inference about the stop based on the location and age of
the suspects as well as their race.
12Full question wording and descriptive statistics are provided in the appendix. Perceptions of police fairness were
asked pre-treatment and separated from treatment by two long, unrelated batteries of questions measuring subjects
dispositions toward conflict and their propensity to engage in politics.
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Overall, this design presents perhaps a best-case scenario to assess whether Whites will ever
perceive racial bias in interactions with the criminal justice system. The drawback of course is
that relative to the Washington state data, this analyses is limited to a group of respondents,
White undergraduate students, that may be more sensitive to issues of racial bias than the general
population. Still, given past results, it remains an open question whether any Whites will perceive
racial bias, even among a population that is potentially predisposed to see these differences.13
3.4 Results
To answer the question of who perceives injustice and racial disparities during interactions with the
criminal justice system, I examine two survey experiments that hold the nature of the experience
constant while varying the race of the suspects. I begin by examining the stop-and-search experi-
ment embedded in the Washington state survey. The key outcomes are whether respondents believe
the search was reasonable, and whether they believe the police’s version of events. The goal is to
illustrate the complex ways in which overall beliefs in the systemic fairness of the police function
differently by the race of the respondents and the race of citizens during hypothetical interactions
with the police.
3.4.1 Perceptions of Racial Bias and Beliefs in the Fairness of Police
Figure 3.1 shows the average treatment effect for the entire sample in the stop-and-search experi-
ment. In the aggregate, whether the suspects were Black or White appears to have little effect on
whether respondents believe the search was reasonable and whose version of events respondents are
willing to believe. These aggregate results, however, mask important differences in how members
of different racial groups perceive these events.
13Furthermore, there is some evidence that young Whites are perhaps less likely to perceive discrimination than
older cohorts. For example, Valentino and Brader (2011) find that perceptions of racial discrimination declined after
the election of President Obama in 2008, and that these declines were particularly large among the youngest age
cohorts.
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Figure 3.1: Effects of Suspects’ Race: The figure shows the average treatment effects for the entire
sample. In the aggregate, varying the race of the suspects appears to have little effect on respondents’
interpretations of the events.
Figure 3.2 shows that the effects of treatment on the probability of agreeing that the search
was reasonable (top panel) and believing the police’s version of events (bottom panel) vary con-
siderably by the race of the respondent. For both outcomes, Black respondents are far less likely
to agree the search was reasonable and to believe the police’s version of events when the suspects
in the experiment were Black. We see a similar, although more muted pattern of behavior among
Hispanics. Among Asians, the race of the suspect appears to have little effect, and among Whites,
there is some marginal evidence that Whites’ are more likely to be believe the search was reasonable
when the suspect is Black (p¡0.10). Whites’ likelihood of believing the police, however, does not
vary with the race of the suspect.
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Figure 3.2: Effects of Suspects’ Race by Respondents’ Race. The figure shows considerable variation
in the average treatment effects conditional on respondents’ race. Black respondents, in particular, are less
likely to believe the police and agree the search was reasonable when the suspects in the scenario are Black.
3.4.2 Perceptions of Racial Bias and Beliefs in the Relative Racial Fairness of Police
It is possible that these gaps across racial groups are due solely to differences in how fair each group
perceives the police to be in general. Whites are more likely than Blacks to believe the police are
generally fair.14 If fairness beliefs functioned the same for Whites and Blacks, then conditioning
on these beliefs should remove the racial gaps in evaluations shown above. In fact, as Tables 3.1
and 3.2 show, the interaction of treatment with respondent race remains largely unchanged when
controlling for respondents’ perceptions of police fairness.
Instead, it appears that the different interpretations of the stop-and-search are due not just to
varying levels of belief in the fairness of the police, but also to the different meaning of these beliefs
to people of different races. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present average treatment effects conditional
14The average perceptions of police is 3.56 among Whites compared to 2.99 among Blacks (p¡0.001).
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Table 3.1: Effect of Suspect Race on Belief Search was Reasonable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 2.57∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.17)
Treatment: Black Suspect −0.06 0.26 0.26
(0.09) (0.14) (0.14)
Black 0.06 0.24
(0.17) (0.17)
Hispanic 0.45∗∗ 0.51∗∗
(0.17) (0.16)
Asian 0.37∗ 0.49∗∗
(0.17) (0.17)
Treatment×Black −0.88∗∗∗ −0.84∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.24)
Treatment×Hispanic −0.51∗ −0.56∗
(0.24) (0.24)
Treatment×Asian −0.31 −0.42
(0.24) (0.23)
Systemic Fairness of Police 0.35∗∗∗
(0.04)
R2 0.00 0.02 0.07
Adj. R2 -0.00 0.02 0.07
Num. obs. 1509 1509 1501
RMSE 1.72 1.71 1.67
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.2: Effect of Suspect Race on Belief of Police’s Version of Events
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 3.35∗∗∗ 3.59∗∗∗ 2.43∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.14)
Treatment: Black Suspect −0.13 −0.10 −0.10
(0.07) (0.11) (0.11)
Black −0.44∗∗∗ −0.25∗
(0.13) (0.13)
Hispanic −0.28∗ −0.23
(0.13) (0.13)
Asian −0.40∗∗ −0.29∗
(0.14) (0.13)
Treatment×Black −0.41∗ −0.39∗
(0.19) (0.19)
Treatment×Hispanic −0.16 −0.21
(0.19) (0.18)
Treatment×Asian 0.22 0.16
(0.19) (0.18)
Systemic Fairness of Police 0.32∗∗∗
(0.03)
R2 0.00 0.04 0.10
Adj. R2 0.00 0.03 0.10
Num. obs. 1500 1500 1493
RMSE 1.37 1.35 1.30
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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on respondents’ race and their perceptions of the fairness of police.15 The top row of graphs in
each figure shows how respondents’ interpretations of the search vary as perceptions of the general
fairness of the police move from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the
sample mean. The blue lines show the conditional means when the suspects are White, the red
lines show the conditional means when the suspects are Black, and the vertical lines provide 95
percent confidence intervals. The bottom row of figures show the distribution of fairness beliefs
within each racial group within a one standard deviation range of the sample mean.
Looking at the first two panels in both Figures 3.3 and 3.4 we see a similar pattern of results
to those found by Hurwitz and Peﬄey (2005b). Note that the actual treatment of the suspects is
the same, regardless of their race. Both were stopped in a bad neighborhood and charged with
possession of drugs. Blacks’ interpretation of these depends on the interaction of their fairness be-
liefs and the race of the suspect. When the suspects were White, Black respondents’ interpretation
of events are unchanged, regardless of how fair they think the police are. When the suspects were
Black, however, Black respondents who think the police generally treat people unfairly and without
respect were far more likely to say the search was unreasonable, and far less likely to believe the
police, compared to respondents who read about White suspects. In contrast, White respondents
seem essentially blind to any racial differences in the treatment of the suspects. White respondents
who think police are generally unfair think both White and Blacks suspects were treated unfairly.
The third and fourth panels in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the results for Hispanics and Asians.
Interestingly, it is Hispanics who think the police are generally fair who perceive the largest gaps
between the treatment of Whites and Blacks, due largely to how they interpret the treatment of
White suspects. Hispanics who believe the police are generally unfair tend to see both the White
and Black suspects as being treated poorly. Hispanics who think the police are generally fair are
more likely to agree the search of the White suspects was fair and more likely to believe the police’s
version of events. Asians, in contrast, exhibit a pattern of response similar to Whites. Those who
think the police are generally fair evaluate the search more favorably, regardless of the suspects’
race.
15Estimates are produced from a linear model interacting treatment with respondents’ race and beliefs about police
fairness. Full regression tables and models fit using ordered logistic regressions are presented in the appendix.
65
white black hisp asian
0
1
2
3
4
5
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
Systemic Fairness of Police
Ag
re
e 
Se
ar
ch
 W
a
s 
R
ea
so
na
bl
e
(5=
 D
efi
nit
ely
 R
ea
so
na
ble
)
Suspects Black White
Reasonable Search
white black hisp asian
0.000.25
0.500.75
1.00
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
Systemic Fairness of Police
Figure 3.3: Effects of Fairness Beliefs Vary By Race The top row of figures show how beliefs that
the search was reasonable vary by respondents’ race and how fair they think the police are in general. The
bottom row shows the distribution of fairness beliefs for each race. Blacks who think the police are generally
unfair are far less likely to say the search was reasonable when the suspects were Black (red line) than when
they were White (blue line). In contrast, Whites and Asians see little difference in reasonableness based on
the race of the suspect, while Hispanics’ fairness beliefs appear to influence only their evaluation of White
suspects.
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Figure 3.4: Effects of Fairness Beliefs Vary By Race The top row of figures show how agreement
with the police’s version of events varies by respondents’ race and how fair they think the police are in
general. The bottom row shows the distribution of fairness beliefs for each race. In general, Blacks are less
likely to believe the police when the suspects were Black (red line) than when they were White (blue line).
In contrasts, suspect race has little effect on the evaluations of Whites and Asians while among Hispanics’
fairness beliefs appear to only influence their belief of the police when the suspects were of White.
One possible explanation for this divergent pattern of interpretations is that Whites’ beliefs
about the fairness of the police are divorced from race. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 repeat the analysis
above, this time by explicitly conditioning on respondents’ beliefs about the relative treatment of
Blacks and Whites. Again each figure in the top row shows how respondents’ interpretations of the
event (whether the search was reasonable and whether they believe the police), vary according to a
one standard deviation change in the beliefs about the relative treatment of Blacks and Whites by
the police. The bottom row of these figures shows the distribution of these beliefs for each racial
group. Consistent with past research, Blacks, more than other groups, think Blacks are treated
less fairly by the police than Whites, but within all four racial groups there are respondents who
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perceive relatively large and relatively small gaps in the relative racial treatment of Blacks and
Whites. Strikingly, even with an explicit measure that identifies Whites who think Blacks are
systematically treated less fairly than Whites by the police, these individuals are no more likely to
perceive differential treatment of Black and White suspects during the stop and search experiment.
For other racial groups, similar patterns emerge. Black respondents who think Blacks are
treated less fairly by the police than Whites draw similar conclusions in this experiment, while
Blacks who perceive smaller racial gaps report similar levels of treatment for the Black and White
suspects. Again, for Hispanics, these relative fairness evaluations appear to primarily influence
their interpretations of the treatment of the White suspects, while for Asians, we see some evidence
that explicit measures of disparate treatment produce expected results, although the confidence
intervals overlap with the conditional estimates for a large range of relative fairness beliefs.
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Figure 3.5: Effects of Explicit Beliefs in Racial Disparities also Vary By Race The top row of figures
show how beliefs that the search was reasonable vary by respondents’ race and how fair they think the police
are in general. The bottom row shows the distribution of explicit measures of how fair respondents think
Blacks are treated by the police relative to Whites. Even Whites who acknowledge Blacks are systematically
treated less fairly than Whites are unlikely to infer differences in the relative treatment of Black and White
suspects in the stop-and-search experiment.
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Figure 3.6: Effects of Explicit Beliefs in Racial Disparities also Vary By Race The top row of figures
show how belief in the police’s version of events vary by respondents’ race and how fair they think the police
are in general. The bottom row shows the distribution of explicit measures of how fair respondents think
Blacks are treated by the police relative to Whites. Even Whites who acknowledge Blacks are systematically
treated less fairly than Whites are no more or less likely to believe the Black suspects’ version of events in
the stop-and-search experiment.
What should we make of these results? First it is helpful to consider the context of the exper-
iment, a police stop-and-search in which drugs are found on suspects who were either White or
Black. Empirically, such experiences are far more common for Blacks and Hispanics than Whites or
Asians (Gelman, Fagan and Kiss, 2012). When asked to evaluate this scenario, the interpretation
of Whites and Asians appear to reflect their general assessments of the fairness of the criminal
system. These beliefs appear to be race neutral. Whites and Asians who think the police are less
fair believe they are “equally unfair” to suspects regardless of race. Even among these respondents
who acknowledge systemic differences in how the police treat Blacks relative to Whites, these beliefs
appear to have no impact on the perception of racial bias in a specific interaction. Blacks’ fairness
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beliefs condition their views of how the Black suspect was treated; Hispanic fairness beliefs appear
to primarily influence their interpretations of the White suspects’ interactions with the police.
The implications of these divergent evaluations depend a great deal on their generality. The
results suggest that the relatively advantaged in society may be particularly resistant to perceiving
racial bias in any one interaction with the police. If this is true for most or all types interactions
with the police, then finding a common ground for reform after events like Michael Brown’s death
in Ferguson, MO, between those who are directly affected by inequalities in the criminal justice
system and those who are not may be difficult. Thus, an immediate question becomes whether
those who are unlikely to experience racially biased forms of policing will ever recognize race as
factor in how people are treated by the police. To explore this question, I now turn to the results
from a second survey experiment, in which concerns about class and the criminal nature of the
interaction are removed.
3.4.3 Perceptions of Racial Bias during a Traffic Stop
The results above suggest that Whites, even Whites who acknowledge systemic racial bias, may be
unlikely to perceive its specific occurrence. To test the generality of this result, I now examine a
second experiment varying the race (Black or White) and reason a driver was stopped (speeding
or failing to use a turn signal) using White respondents from a student subject pool. I consider
several outcomes to capture perceptions of racial bias in the treatment of the hypothetical driver.
Specifically, I ask respondents whether they thought race was a factor in the stop; whether they
thought the driver actually broke the law; whether the driver would be given a ticket and fine or just
a warning, and whether they believed the driver would win the case if the ticket were challenged
in court. For each outcome, I examine how effects vary by the driver’s race and offense, first in the
aggregate, and then conditional on respondents’ perceptions of the fairness of the police, using the
summary measure described above.
The top row in Figure 3.7 shows that in both the speeding and turn signal conditions, respon-
dents are far more likely to believe race was factor in the stop when the driver was Black. The
bottom row shows how these beliefs vary with a one standard deviation change in perceptions
of police fairness (i.e. moving from a subject who thinks the police are generally unfair to fair).
Overall, the more fair respondents believe the police are in general, the less likely they are to think
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race played a role in the decision to stop the driver. For the speeding condition, in particular,
respondents were far more likely to believe race played a factor.
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Figure 3.7: Was race a factor in why the driver was stopped? White respondents who question the
fairness of the police in general are more likely to think race was a factor when the driver was Black.
The top row in Figure 3.8 shows no differences based on the race of the driver in subjects’
perceptions of whether the driver actually broke the law and was thus rightfully stopped by the
police. The bottom row of Figure 3.8 suggests that respondents who think the police are generally
unfair are less likely to think that the Black driver broke the law. Again as perceptions of police
fairness increase, respondents are more likely to believe that the Black driver broke the law and
less likely to perceive disparities in the treatment of the Black driver relative to White driver.
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Figure 3.8: Did the driver break the law? White respondents who think the police are unfair are less
likely to think the Black driver actually broke law.
Figure 3.9 suggests that respondents believe that theBlack driver was far more likely to get a
ticket and fine (as opposed to warning and no fine), particularly in the turn signal condition (a
situation in which the police may exhibit more discretion in deciding whether to stop a motorist).
Conditional on the respondents’ prior conceptions of police fairness, people who think the police
are generally unfair are more likely to to say the Black driver will receive a harsher treatment at
the hands of the police. Respondents who think the police are generally fair offer similar estimates
for how leniently they treat the driver, regardless of the driver’s race.
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Figure 3.9: Will the driver get a ticket or warning? White respondents who think the police are
unfair assume the Black driver will be more likely to get a ticket than the White driver.
Finally, the top row in Figure 3.10 suggests that, in the aggregate, respondents saw no difference
in how the driver would fair if he challenged the ticket in court. The bottom row again suggests
that these aggregate comparisons mask underlying differences created by respondents’ beliefs about
the fairness of the police. In both the speeding and traffic signal conditions, respondents who think
police are generally fair believe a Black driver will have better chance of winning his case in court
compared to respondents who think the police (and presumably the criminal justice system) are
generally unfair.
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Figure 3.10: Will the driver win in court if he challenges his ticket? White respondents who think
the police are unfair assume the Black driver will fair worse in court than the White driver.
Taken together these results show that there are at least some cases where some Whites perceive
racial bias in citizens’ interactions with the police. Specifically, when evaluating a more ambiguous
interaction, less explicitly linked to crime, Whites’ prior beliefs about the general fairness of the
police do appear to condition perception of the relative treatment of Blacks and Whites. To be
sure, White undergraduate students differ from the general population in many important ways, but
these results provide at least some evidence that Whites are not completely blind to the possibility
of racial bias.16
16The data from the Washington state survey also provide some evidence of cohort effects. Among White respon-
dents under the age of 25 (N=49), general fairness beliefs appear to predict differences in whether these respondents
felt the search was reasonable (less reasonable when the suspects were Black and the respondents believed the police
were generally unfair) but not whether the subjects would believe the police.
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3.5 Conclusion
Police shootings like the one that resulted in the death of Michael Brown are symptomatic of larger
racial disparities in the U.S. criminal justice system. Given these disparities, we would like to know
who is likely to perceives racial bias in the administration of justice, why people differ in these
perceptions, and what the consequences of those differences are. The findings presented in this
chapter speak most directly to the first question and have implications for the latter two.
In terms of who perceives racial injustice, the current studies build upon past research to show
how a person’s race interacts with his or her beliefs about the overall and relative racial fairness
of the system. The findings from the stop-and-search experiment, in particular, demonstrate large
divides in who believes that race plays a factor in how people are treated by the police. Specifically,
for Whites and Asians in the study, evaluations of the criminal justice system appear to be made
largely independent of race. People who think the system is unjust view the suspects in the stop-
and-search as being treated less fairly regardless of whether the suspects were Black or White. This
is true even for Whites and Asians who acknowledge a high degree of relative inequality in how the
police treat Blacks relative to Whites. For Blacks and Hispanics, however, justice has an explicitly
racial meaning. Blacks’ beliefs about the relative fairness of the police primarily shape how they
believe other Blacks are treated by the police. In contrast, Hispanics’ evaluations of systemic
fairness appear to primarily shape beliefs about how the police treat Whites.
As to why perceptions of both general and relative fairness appear to operate so differently for
people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, there are at least two types of explanations. The
first focuses on aspects of the design of each study. The second considers more conceptual issues
relating to the origins and operation of fairness beliefs.
Measurement, framing and other aspects of research design play an important role in the inter-
pretation of any study’s results, and it is possible the present results are shaped by social desirability
bias and framing effects. Consider the finding that even Whites and Asians who say the police treat
Blacks worse than Whites in general do not see any evidence of racial bias during the stop-and-
search experiment. It is possible that this measure of relative racial fairness is particularly prone
to social desirability bias. People participating in a survey about race and the criminal justice
system may believe they’re supposed to acknowledge racial disparities, but when asked to evaluate
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a particular interaction, their more implicit beliefs take over. A more nuanced measure might be
able to distinguish between people who truly believe Blacks are treated worse than Whites by the
Police from those who think it is the right thing to say. Similarly, it may be the case that the
evaluations of the stop-and-search experiment are influenced by specific features of the hypotheti-
cal scenario. As Hurwitz and Peﬄey note in discussing the design of the experiment, the context
of the stop-and-search experiment may imply guilt to some and suggest racial profiling to others.
The results of the traffic stop experiment suggest that in at least some scenarios, Whites’ fairness
beliefs do predict perceptions of racial bias. These findings also come with caveats and questions
for future research. It is possible that college students are particularly attuned to issues of race
and bias, and with a more representative sample a pattern of results similar to those found in
the Washington state study would emerge. Yet the traffic-stop experiment also differs from the
stop-and-search experiment in several ways. It examines a less criminal, more everyday interaction
in which there is a greater level of police discretion. The traffic-stop experiment also holds class
constant by explicitly mentioning what hopefully remains a middle class occupation. In doing so it
removes one alternative explanation people may have for disparities which is that police injustice is
not so much a function of race as poverty. Teasing apart which aspects of the design matter most
in the evaluations of both Whites and other minorities represents an avenue of future research.
Issues of measurement and framing alone, however, cannot offer a full explanation for the pattern
of results presented above. For example, social desirability bias might account for the null findings
among Whites and Asians, but it is unclear how it could explain the pattern of responses among
Blacks and Hispanics. Why then do beliefs about general and relative fairness appear to mean such
different things to people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds?
The studies in this chapter treat beliefs about general and relative fairness as fixed. In the
context of a survey experiment, this may be a reasonable assumption and one which is useful for
demonstrating the differences across race and ethnicity in how these beliefs function. Doing so,
however, obscures the complex process, or indeed processes, that explain how citizens come to hold
these beliefs and give them meaning. A portion of the variation may reflect individual differences
that are relatively stable and innate, things like personality and ideology. Yet, variation in these
beliefs also reflect external factors that vary across both individuals and groups–things like personal
experience with the police and the criminal justice system, the experiences of our peers, and the
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relative treatment of groups we identify with.
How these pieces fit together has larger implications for the ability and likelihood of the U.S. to
address disparities in it’s present system of justice. The varied meanings of fairness have implica-
tions not just for how the advantage in society will perceive injustice, but also how the disadvantage
may respond to reform. As it stands, if one portion of society sees the criminal justice system as
wholly race neutral, while another believes the system is biased against one group or in favor of
another, then finding a consensus to address racial inequalities in the current system may be diffi-
cult. Understanding the complexity of how citizens think about justice and fairness in relation to
race is crucial to overcoming this impasse.
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Chapter 4
Selective Injustice: The Role of Expe-
riences and Dispositions in Evaluations
of the Criminal Justice System
4.1 Introduction
The idea that justice is colorblind in the U.S. is belied by the reality of a system in which minorities
in general, and Blacks, in particular, suffer consistently worse outcomes than Whites. The U.S.
imprisons more people than any other nation in the world, with racial minorities making up a
disproportionate share of the incarcerated (Walmsley, 2015; Western, 2006). Racial disparities are
not limited to prisons, but are instead evident at virtually every stage of the legal process from
contact and arrests to trial and sentencing (Spohn, 2013). While a portion of this inequality can
be attributed to different patterns of offense in these groups, these differences also reflect a system
of laws and policies that disproportionately impact racial minorities (Tonry, 1995).
The disparate impact of these policies has helped create two very different views of justice in
America (Peﬄey and Hurwitz, 2010; Bobo and Johnson, 2004). In short, Whites are far more likely
to believe the system is generally fair, and to attribute what disparities exist to characteristics and
decisions of individuals. For minorities, and Blacks in particular, the opposite is true: they view the
institutions of the criminal justice system in a more negative light and are more likely to attribute
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crime and racial disparities to systemic causes.
How can the U.S. address racial inequalities in its criminal justice system when a large portion
of society does not acknowledge that there is a problem? Any answer to this question requires a
consideration of how perceptions of justice are formed and change. Existing theory and research
offer three types of explanations. First, many scholars, particularly proponents of procedural justice,
focus on how citizens’ personal experiences with the institutions of criminal justice lead them to form
general evaluations of the system as a whole. Second, in political science and criminology, scholars
recognize that these experiences may be supplemented and amplified by information conveyed
vicariously through social interactions and the media. Finally, work in both political science and
social psychology suggests that justice beliefs may also reflect dispositional variation in how people
see the world.
Separately, work from each of these fields helps explain why perceptions of justice are divided
by race. Yet, if we wish to know how these gaps might change we need to think about how these
factors function collectively. In this chapter, I offer a holistic framework for understanding how
experiences, vicarious information, and dispositions interact to shape people’s evaluations of the
criminal justice system in general. Specifically, this approach highlights the need to think about
how relatively stable dispositions condition both the incidence and impact of information citizens
receive about the criminal justice system. Building on this framework, I explore the potential of
information conveyed through diverse experiences to shape Whites’ perceptions of the relative racial
fairness of the police. I find conflicting results. In observational analysis, I find that information
conveyed though both personal and vicarious experiences shapes perceptions of the racial fairness
of the police in ways we would expect. Consistent with theories of tolerance and intergroup contact,
people with more diverse experiences tend to be more likely to perceive racial injustice, and this is
particularly true of people predisposed to view the system more fairly. These results are tempered,
however, by the findings of a unique experimental design that allows me to assess how people’s
propensity to select the kind information they receive changes the effects of those messages. By
modeling the propensity of individuals to seek out or avoid relevant information, the experiment
finds that randomized exposure to information about the relative racial fairness of the police has
a polarizing effect. Combined, these results have important implications for how we might find a
common ground to address inequalities in our criminal justice system.
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4.2 Perceptions of Racial Fairness in the Criminal System
The criminal justice system in the U.S. is marked by racial disparities in both contact and out-
comes. For example, studies suggest that Blacks use illicit drugs at rates comparable to their peers,
yet account for over 30 percent of arrests and over 40 percent of incarcerations for drug law viola-
tions.1 Overall, Blacks are arrested nearly three times more often than are members of other races
(Department of Justice, 2014). During arrests, Blacks are more likely to be subjected to police
searches (Bowling and Phillips, 2007; Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel, 2014) and to both
the threat and use of police force (Jacobs, 1998; Eith and Durose, 2011). At trial, Blacks and other
minorities tend to receive worse representation (Kutateladze et al., 2014) and to suffer harsher out-
comes (Mustard, 2001), particularly when facing all-white juries (Anwar, Bayer and Hjalmarsson,
2012).Some people see these disparities as a call for reform. But many do not. Instead of systemic
flaws, they are more likely to view racial disparities in criminal justice as a product of individual
choices and dispositions (Peﬄey and Hurwitz, 2010). Finding a common ground to address these
issues, then, requires an understanding of how people form beliefs about the fairness of the criminal
justice system and the factors that may cause these attitudes to change.
The most direct answer is that people form opinions about the fairness of the police, courts and
prisons based on their personal experiences with these institutions. Research on legitimacy in social
psychology finds that these evaluations are a function of both the outcome and the process of the
experience (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006). When these institutions are perceived to employ
fair procedures, citizens are more like to accept the legitimacy of adverse outcomes(Tyler and Huo,
2002). These individual experiences in turn shape people’s broader evaluations and support of the
system and authorities that produced them (Tyler et al., 1999).
Yet for many Americans such personal experiences may be rare.2 Evaluations of the crimi-
nal justice system are also influenced by information conveyed through social interactions and the
media. For example, both Rosenbaum et al. (2005) and Mondak et al. (n.d.) find evidence that
1See (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2013) for rates of drug use and “The Drug
War, Mass Incarceration and Race”, Drug Policy Alliance, (2015, 12 June), Retrieved from: http://www.drugpolicy.
org/resource/drug-war-mass-incarceration-and-race for rates of arrest.
2According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics most recent Police-Public Contact Survey, in 2011 about one in four
Americans over the age of 16 had one or more contacts with the police in the past year (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2011; Langton et al., 2013).
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knowing people who have had good or bad experiences with the police and courts influences atti-
tudes in predictable ways. Positive vicarious experiences lead to more positive evaluations, while
negative vicarious experiences are associated with more negative attitudes toward the police. Sim-
ilarly, the media shape perceptions of both the incidence and causes of crime (Peﬄey, Shields and
Williams, 1996; Roberts, 1992; Roberts and Doob, 1990). These beliefs, in turn, influence people’s
views on specific policies and the justice system in general (Surette, 2014; Dowler, 2003; Gilliam
and Iyengar, 2000; Jamieson, 1993; Graber, 1980). Furthermore, the media’s tendency to cover
the issue of violent crime through racial frames reinforces stereotypes and widens attitudinal gaps
between Whites and Blacks (Entman, 1992; Gilens, 1996).
Information, whether obtained directly or vicariously, does not affect all people equally. In-
stead, research in political science and social psychology finds that new information is often filtered
through people’s longstanding prior beliefs and worldviews (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2006).
Political science often conceptualizes these worldviews in terms of ideology, defined in terms of a
spectrum of liberal to conservative beliefs that provide an organizing framework for politics (Ellis
and Stimson, 2012; Converse, 1964). Conover and Feldman (1981) find that support for the status
quo and institutions of social control are key predictors of conservative beliefs and Rubin and Pe-
plau (1975) show that conservatives are more likely to believe in a just world, that is, the idea that
people generally deserved the outcomes they recieved (See also Lerner, 1980; Lerner and Miller,
1978). Peﬄey and Hurwitz (2010) show that ideology strongly predicts perceptions of systemic
fairness, particularly among the most educated. These general beliefs in turn have specific pol-
icy consequences: conservatives tend to favor more punitive policies while liberals show a greater
support for programs aimed at rehabilitation (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002; Cullen, Fisher and
Applegate, 2000).
Work in social psychology offers an additional perspective for why individuals’ worldviews or
ideologies influence their perceptions of the criminal justice system. System justification theorists
have recast ideology within a broader framework of motivated cognition (Jost, 2006). Jost and
colleagues, in particular, argue that people have a cognitive need to justify not only their individual
and group status in society, but also the system and institutions that create those hierarchies (Jost,
Federico and Napier, 2009; Jost and Amodio, 2012). Support for the status quo among conservatives
is due in part to higher need for system justification among these individuals. Similarly, moral
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foundation theorists posit that differences in the policy preferences of liberals and conservatives
arise from different conceptions of what is morally just (Haidt and Graham, 2007; Haidt, 2012).
Liberals tend to emphasize issues related to care and fairness, while conservatives, in addition to
these more liberal foundations, also rely on considerations of in-group loyalty, respect for authority,
and concerns about purity to make moral decisions.
Ideologies and worldviews have both dispositional and situational components (Jost and Hun-
yady, 2005). These beliefs are dispositional in that they reflect innate traits that are rooted in both
our genes and early life experiences, origins that make them stable and resistant to change over
time. For example, recent work in biology and politics suggests that ideology is highly heritable
and thus partially determined by genetic factors (Alford, Funk and Hibbing, 2008, 2005). Similarly,
Jost and Amodio (2012) find that system justification behavior is correlated with other heritable
traits and physiological behaviors that suggest at least part of the observed variation we see in
individuals is driven by factors that are causally prior to whatever political and social experiences
they might have. Second, these traits are situational in that their full effects may only become
apparent in certain contexts. For example, Nail et al. (2009) find that even liberals became more
supportive of conservative policies in the wake of a systemic threat to national security created by
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001.
Together these three sources of fairness beliefs explain not just why people differ in their eval-
uations of the criminal justice system, but also offer insight into the factors that may cause these
attitudes to change. First, dispositions provide a baseline source of variation. Conservatives, peo-
ple with higher need for system justification, will be more likely to perceive the present system as
generally fair and just, and thus less likely to recognize racial disparities as a product of systemic
issues. Second, dispositions condition the factors that may cause people to change their beliefs–
namely their personal experiences and the indirect information they receive vicariously through
peers and the media.
With regard to personal experiences, we know from work by Tyler et al. (1999) and others
that people who experience injustice directly come to view the system as a whole less favorably.
Whether these experiences in turn increase perceptions of racial disparities in the criminal justice
system is a more complicated question. The answer likely depends also on characteristics of the
individuals in question and their social contexts. If a person already believes such inequalities exist,
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personally experiencing mistreatment will only reinforce this belief. For people likely to think the
system treats people fairly regardless of race, the effect of a negative experience may depend on
the context in which it occurs. If one’s peers have also had more negative experiences, then that
person may hold more negative views of the system in general, but still believe that it treats all
people equally, albeit poorly. However, if one’s bad experiences stand in contrast to those of one’s
peers, then such dissonance at the personal level may lead to greater perceptions of inequality at
a systemic level. In short, negative experiences are unlikely to change the beliefs of people who
already think the system is unfair, and may only increase perceptions of racial inequality among
people who find their personal negative experiences to be in conflict with their peers. Similarly,
people with positive personal experiences may discount the negative encounters of their peers.
In addition to potentially moderating the effect of personal experiences, vicarious information
may have a direct effect on people’s perceptions of racial injustice. Again, the impact of such
information likely varies by people’s prior dispositions. Existing research provides conflicting ex-
pectations for the nature of this heterogeneity. One possibility is that people simply update their
beliefs in the direction of the information they receive. Liberals presented with positive information
about the criminal justice system should see the system as more fair and equal, while conservatives
presented with negative information should see it as less so. Research on intergroup contact and
political tolerance lends some support for this view. Studies of intergroup contact generally find
that, under the right conditions, these experiences may help reduce stereotypes and increase em-
pathy toward the outgroup in general (Allport, 1954 (1979; Pettigrew, 1998). Similarly, research
on political discussion and disagreement finds that exposure to views different from one’s own is
associated with increased levels of trust and political knowledge (Mutz, 2006, 2002). Research on
motivated reasoning often finds that people will counter-argue information inconsistent with their
prior beliefs (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Redlawsk, 2002; Lodge and Taber, 2000; Kunda, 1990). Sim-
ilarly, Testa, Hibbing and Ritchie (2014) argue that gains in political tolerance from disagreement
may be concentrated among the people most likely to seek it out. If so, the exposure to diverse
information may actually polarize beliefs, as liberals and conservatives come to hold their prior
beliefs more strongly.
These expectations are further complicated by the fact that dispositions also shape the inci-
dence of experiences and exposure to diverse information. People tend to associate with others
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similar to themselves (Marsden, 1988, 1987), and to seek out media sources that provide informa-
tion consistent with their prior beliefs (Stroud, 2010, 2008). The reality that people select the kinds
of information and experiences they have creates several additional challenges for answering these
questions. First, in observational analysis alone, it is difficult to establish causality. Do liberals
perceive greater injustice because they tend to have more diverse experiences, or is the relation-
ship simply a function of the correlation of both experiences and fairness beliefs with ideology?
Research on intergroup contact tends to discount the consequences of selection bias, concluding
that the “path from contact to prejudice is typically stronger than the path from prejudice to
contact”(Pettigrew, 2008, p. 188). These claims are strongest when made by studies that leverage
situations in which the exposure to diversity can be plausibly described as-if randomly assigned
(e.g. Carrell, Hoekstra and West, 2015; Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Yet, even if we are confident
that exposure to diverse information has some effect in the aggregate, failing to account for selection
can obscure significant heterogeneity (Gaines and Kuklinski, 2011; Knox et al., n.d.). For example,
when presented with evidence of injustice, liberals and moderates may perceive greater inequality.
Conservatives, who may have avoided this information, may discount or counter-argue. The overall
effect of the information may be positive,null, or even negative, depending on the distribution of
liberals, moderates and conservatives in society.
4.3 Research Design
The previous section provides a framework for thinking about how citizens form evaluations of the
criminal justice system. By taking a holistic perspective, it highlights potential sources of stability,
change, and heterogeneity. I explore these dynamics in three studies. The first study leverages a
unique dataset that contains information about individuals’ personal experiences with the criminal
justice system, the experiences of their peers, as well as their general dispositions, allowing me
to assess how these factors interact to influence perceptions of the relative racial fairness of the
police. The second study provides a partial replication of theses results, focusing specifically on
the way exposure to diversity may influence evaluations of the police and the legal system, again
conditional on characteristics of individuals. Given that, as a group, Whites tend to be less likely
than minorities to perceive systemic injustice, I focus my analysis on only the White respondents
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to each survey. Perceptions of injustice among minorities is clearly an important issue, one which
I return to in the conclusion of this paper. The third study addresses a specific concern of these
observational analyses, namely that the observed relationships conveivably are due to self-selection
rather than information conveyed by personal and vicarious experience. It does so by incorporating
self-selection into the design of a survey experiment, and modeling people’s propensities to seek
out or avoid information that may conflict with their prior beliefs.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Study 1: The Effects of Personal Experiences, Vicarious Information and Dispositions
on Perceptions of the Racial Fairness of Police
To assess how personal experiences, vicarious information, and dispositions shape evaluations of the
relative racial fairness of the criminal justice system in the U.S., I turn first to the 2012 Justice in
Washington State Survey (JWSS) which contained detailed measures of each of these factors. The
JWSS is an Internet survey administered by YouGov between June 14 and July 2, 2012. It contains
1,514 total respondents, 605 of whom are White.3 Designed to study perceptions and experiences
with the criminal justice system in Washington State, the JWSS is uniquely suited to answer the
questions posed above. It contains measures of direct personal experience with the criminal justice
system as well as a network battery designed to measure respondents’ acquaintances’ experiences
with the criminal justice system.
The primary outcome for this dataset is constructed from a set of questions asking respon-
dents what percent of the time the police treat members of different racial groups fairly (0=Never,
100=Always). I take the difference between the reported treatment of Whites and Blacks to con-
struct a measure of relative racial fairness. The measure has a theoretical range of -100 (Blacks
always treated fairly, Whites never treated fairly) to 100 (Whites always fair, Blacks never fair)
and a mean of 25.08 (sd=29.64) among Whites in the JWSS. Critically, the measure does not speak
to a respondent’s general view of the fairness of the justice system, but rather to whether there
is any race-based difference in how the system is perceived. A value of zero would mean that a
3Survey weights are used to approximate the census-based demographic characteristics of Whites in Washington
state.
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respondent perceives Blacks and Whites to be treated equally, but a value of zero could also be
obtained because the respondent assigned both groups scores of zero or scores of 100. The mean
of 25.08 indicates that, on average, Whites believe that the justice system is more fair to their
own group than to Blacks. As indicated by the 29.64 standard deviation, variation around that
mean is substantial. Overall, 82 percent of Whites indicated that the justice system is more fair to
Whites than to Blacks, 9 percent saw no racial disparity in the fairness of the justice system, and
10 percent responded that the system is more fair to Blacks than to Whites.
Because no individual can have personal experience with how the police treat members of a
different race than them self, I expect that their perceptions of the relative racial fairness will be
primarily influenced by the extent which Whites have exposure to black experiences with the police
through their social networks. I expect these experiences to operate in two ways. First, simply
knowing someone of a different race with experiences (good or bad) with the police may be enough
to alter perceptions of how the police treat Blacks relative to Whites. Even if this black peer has
not personally experienced poor treatment, they may convey the relative experiences of Blacks as
group with the police, with which their white peer might be otherwise be unfamiliar with. Second,
the specific content of those experiences may also affect beliefs. Knowing a black person with a
particularly bad experience with the police may widen perceptions of inequality, while knowing a
black person with good experiences may decrease any perceived gaps. To capture these two effects,
I make use of unique network battery in JWSS that asked respondents to list up to three people
they knew who had had experiences with the police. For each person they listed, respondents were
asked to give the race of that person and to rate each peer’s experiences on a seven-point scale
that ranges from very unfair and disrespectful (-3) to very fair and respectful (3).4 From these
questions, I construct two measures of vicarious exposure: First, I create an indicator of whether
the respondent listed any black acquaintances with experiences with the police to capture the direct
effects of simply knowing people who are black. Second, I create a cumulative measure of these
black peers’ experiences with the police by summing the reported experience for each black peer and
dividing by the number of black peers. Taking network averages facilitates comparisons of networks
of different sizes (Klofstad, Sokhey and McClurg, 2013). As with other social networks, there is a
4The network questions were unfortunately asked after the the dependent variables. This ordering may lead
respondents to list more peers with bad experiences with the police, although in the data, the majority of White
respondents listed White peers (84.5 percent) and the majority of their peers experiences were positive (55.0 percent).
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considerable degree of racial homophily, with only about 10 percent (N=56) of respondents reporting
knowing one or more black peers that had experiences with the police, and the majority (N=49)
listed only one black acquaintance. About 45 percent of black experiences with the police were
describe negative, 14 percent were neutral and 44 positive were positive. Over half of respondents
who reported knowing at least one black peer had networks of white peers whose experiences with
the police were on average better than those of their black peers, while approximately one quarter
each reported that their black peers’ experiences with the police were better and another quarter
equal to those of their white peers.
With regard to personal experiences and individual dispositions, I explore the extent to which
these factors may directly influence perceptions of the relative racial fairness of police, and the
degree to which these factors may moderate the impact of vicarious exposure. Dispositional factors
are captured with a five-point measure of ideology (5=strong conservative) having a mean of 3.06
(sd=1.21). Consistent with the general findings of system justification theorists, I expect that
conservatives should be less likely than liberals to perceive racial inequality. Personal experiences
are captured by two measures of respondent’s self-reported treatment by the police summed together
to create a single scale . Specifically, the questions asked respondents how often they had been
treated unfairly or rudely by the police using a five-point scale (0= Never, 1=1-2 times, 2=3-4
times, 3= 5-6 times, 4=7 + times). Taking the items as an interval variable, the additive scale has
a mean of 0.88 (sd=1.31) with 52 percent reporting having never been treated unfairly or rudely
by the police. My expectations for the effects of personal experience are more complex. While past
work finds that being treated poorly by the police is associated with more negative views of the
police in general, it is unclear whether these experiences would also effect perceptions of relative
injustice. If these experiences also affect beliefs about the relative racial fairness of the police, they
may do so directly, or possibly indirectly by making individuals more receptive to the experiences
of others. All models use survey weights and include controls for the size of respondents’ vicarious
police-encounter network, as well as their gender, education, and income.
Table 4.1 presents the results of this analysis. The first column shows a simple additive model,
in which the effects of dispositions, personal experience, and vicarious exposure to black experiences
are allowed to operate independently. We see that each has an effect on perceptions of the relative
racial fairness. In particular, having at least one black peer has about the same effect on perceptions
88
of racial injustice as moving from being a strong conservative to a strong liberal. Personal negative
experiences with the police are also associated with higher levels of perceived inequality.
The remaining columns in Table 4.1 explore how dispositions and personal experience may
condition the effects of vicarious exposure. The model in column 2 allows the effects of having
black peers to vary conditional on a respondents’ personal experiences. Looking at the entire
sample, it appears that the effects of vicarious exposure are relatively constant. The coefficient on
the interaction between personal experience and black peers is substantively small and statistically
insignificant. However, when looking at liberals and conservatives separately, a different pattern
of response emerges. Among liberals, the effect of having black peers is large, regardless of a
liberal’s personal experiences with the police. In contrast, among conservatives, the effects having
black peers appears concentrated among individuals that also reported having negative personal
experiences.
Figure 4.1 shows predicted values from interaction models for conservatives (left panel) and
liberals (right panel) varying personal experiences with the police as well as vicarious exposure
to Blacks’ experiences with the police, holding all other variables in the model constant at their
sample medians or modal values. The first pair of bars in each panel shows the predicted values
for someone with no personal negative experience when they have no vicarious exposure to black
experiences (red bars) and some vicarious exposure to black experience (blue bars). The second
pair of bars show the predicted values for someone with a value of 2 on the personal negative
experience with the police (approximately 1 standard deviation above the scale’s mean), again for
people with (red) and without (blue) black peers. Looking first at the results for liberals in the
right hand panel, we see that on average, liberals perceive a great deal of inequality in how the
police treat Blacks relative to Whites, and this is particularly true of liberals that know Blacks
who have had experiences with the police. In contrast, for conservatives who have never personally
been treated poorly by the police, knowing black peers has no effect on perceptions relative racial
fairness. However, among conservatives who report some level of negative experience with the
police, knowing a black peer has a dramatic effect increasing the predicted amount of perceived
racial inequality to a level similar to that reported by liberals.
How should we interpret this heterogeneous pattern of results? One possible view is that vicar-
ious experiences matter, but they matter differently based on individual level differences. Liberals
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seem to respond to black experiences similarly, while for conservatives the effects are conditional
a person’s own experiences with the police. These patterns suggest that liberals are inclined to
believe that the justice system is unfair to African Americans, and also that liberals are inclined
to accept their black acquaintances’ experiences as evidence of that unfairness. Conservatives, in
contrast, are not prone to see the justice system as unfair to African Americans. However, their own
bad experiences with the justice system bring credence to information received from their African
American acquaintances. Hence, for conservatives, the justice system is not perceived as unfair to
Blacks unless both personal and vicarious experiences point to systemic unfairness.
An alternative claim is that these results are spurious and instead reflect some combination
of bias arising from self-selection and omitted variables. After all, if vicarious experiences truly
altered beliefs, why did the content of those experiences not have an effect? Yet if exposure to black
experiences is simply the product of self selection, why are the effects constant among liberals but
vary among conservatives based on their experiences with the police? In the end, it is possible that
both interpretations have merit; vicarious experiences may shape attitudes but answering further
questions like how much, for whom, and when requires additional data and, ultimately, a more
sophisticated research design.5
4.4.2 Study 2: Racial Diversity, Perceptions of Racial Inequality and Trust in the Criminal
Justice System
The results of the previous study suggests both dispositions and experiences matter in White
perceptions of racial inequality in the criminal justice system. Specifically, the findings suggest
vicarious exposure to black experiences with the police may be particularly important. To explore
the generality of this result, I examine data for white respondents to the 2004 National Politics Study
(NPS).6 While not specifically designed to study attitudes toward the criminal justice system, the
NPS contains several items that capture elements of both the outcomes and predictors of interest.
Specifically, I examine how perceptions of discrimination and trust in the police and legal system
5That is, the need for additional data is two-fold: We need data that can provide leverage into concerns about
self selection. We also need data with a sufficient number of observations to allow for comparisons within groups like
liberals and conservatives.
6The NPS was designed to contain large oversample of racial minorities in addition to Whites. The complicated
sampling frame means that even after weighting it is not a nationally representative sample, with respondents tending
to be older and higher income (Jackson et al., 2009)
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Figure 4.1: The figure shows how the effect of vicarious exposure to black experiences with the
polcie varies by personal experiences with the police for conservatives (left) and liberals (right).
shows predicted values from interaction models for conservatives (left panel) and liberals (right
panel). The first pair of bars in each panel shows the predicted values for someone with no personal
negative experience when they have no vicarious exposure to black experiences (red bars) and some
vicarious exposure to black experience (blue bars). The second pair, show the effect of black peers
for someone who reported at least some negative experiences with the police. Being exposed to
black experiences with police increases perceptions of racial inequality among liberals, regardless
of experience, but only conservatives with some negative, personal experience with the police.
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All Respondents Interaction Liberals Lib (Int) Conservatives Con (Int)
(Intercept) 46.72∗∗∗ 46.80∗∗∗ 25.12∗∗∗ 25.14∗∗∗ −1.27 3.48
(5.43) (5.46) (6.95) (6.97) (7.14) (7.15)
Personal Negative Experience 2.36∗ 2.29∗ 1.31 1.85 2.29 0.17
(0.99) (1.08) (1.47) (1.70) (1.92) (2.01)
Any Black Peers 12.08∗∗ 11.54∗ 18.36∗∗ 20.65∗∗ 19.44∗ −5.73
(4.40) (5.49) (6.57) (7.53) (9.34) (12.46)
Vicarious Black Experience −0.05 0.10 2.68 2.01 −3.35 1.20
(1.68) (1.92) (2.46) (2.69) (3.77) (3.99)
Ideology −11.65∗∗∗ −11.67∗∗∗
(1.00) (1.01)
No. of Discussants 0.53 0.54 2.86 2.78 0.94 1.93
(1.02) (1.03) (1.72) (1.73) (1.88) (1.86)
Education 1.29 1.28 −0.39 −0.44 1.73 1.46
(0.88) (0.89) (1.33) (1.34) (1.61) (1.58)
Income 0.47 0.47 1.41∗ 1.35∗ −0.58 −1.08
(0.40) (0.40) (0.60) (0.61) (0.76) (0.76)
Female 5.07∗ 5.02∗ 5.48 5.78 4.81 1.82
(2.47) (2.49) (4.05) (4.09) (4.54) (4.55)
Personal*Black Peers 0.44 −1.99 20.80∗∗
(2.71) (3.17) (7.02)
R2 0.30 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.11
Adj. R2 0.29 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.06
Num. obs. 477 477 157 157 165 165
RMSE 25.40 25.43 23.10 23.15 27.59 26.93
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 4.1: Difference in Perception of Police Treatment of Whites Relative to Blacks
vary according to the level of the racial diversity respondents report in various social contexts.
Discrimination is measured by a four-point scale asking respondents whether they believed Blacks
“face a lot of discrimination (3), some (2), a little (1), or no discrimination at all (0)” Trust in the
police and legal system are captured by four-point scales asking respondents how much of the time
they think they can trust each institution (0=Never, 4=Just about always, mean). On average,
respondents believed Blacks faced some discrimination (mean=2.13, sd=0.72), and respondents
were generally trusting of the police (mean=2.93, sd=0.66) and the legal system (mean=2.62,
sd=0.68).
The key predictor of each outcome is a measure of the racial diversity of a respondent’s social
environment. The measure is constructed from four times items asking respondents to describe the
racial composition of their workplace, neighborhood, network of friends, and place of worship, sep-
arately. Responses other than “mostly white” are coded as one, and an additive diversity measure
is formed using the sum of responses across these four contexts (mean=1.64, sd=1.23). If exposure
to minority experiences matters, then Whites who inhabit more racially diverse social contexts
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should be more likely to perceive racial discrimination, and less likely to trust the institutions of
the criminal justice system to do what is right. All models are estimated using ordered logistic
regressions and include controls of ideology, demographics and religiosity which Cook and Gronke
(2005) find is related to trust in institutions.7 The models for trust also include the measure of
perceived discrimination against Blacks. I look first at the results for the full sample, and then
explore whether the relationships vary when estimated separately for liberals and conservatives.
Table 4.2 presents the results for perceived discrimination against Blacks. Looking first at the
results for all White respondents, we see that racial diversity is a strong predictor of whether the
respondent thinks Blacks are discriminated against in society. Interestingly, it seems that the effect
of exposure to non-whites is primarily concentrated among conservatives, a group who on average
are less likely than liberals and moderates to acknowledge discrimination of Blacks in society. The
results in Table 4.3 suggest that racial diversity is not only associated with greater perceptions of
discrimination but also linked to lower levels of trust in both the police and legal system. The
effects are particular large for conservatives’ levels of trust in the police, while comparable for
liberals’ and conservatives; views of the legal system. For a conservative, the probability of saying
they trust the police just about always declines by about 5 percentage points for each increase
in the racial diversity of their social context. (i.e. reporting that one’s workplace, neighborhood,
church or peer group is not “mostly white”) Interestingly, while racial diversity was associated with
a higher likelihood of saying Blacks face discrimination among conservatives, these perceptions of
racial discrimination do not appear to influence conservatives’ trust in the police and legal system.
As with the previous study, then, a portion of these results likely reflects some element of selection.
For example, levels of racial diversity tend to be higher among liberals than conservatives. If people
were actively selecting into or out of experiences, we might expect diversity to be lowest among
higher income conservatives (those with the means to shape their environment). In fact, we find the
opposite, incomes tend to be higher among both liberals and conservatives reporting some exposure
to racial diversity in their social context. While selection may play a role, the experiences conveyed
7Ideology is measured using a three-point scale asking respondents whether they identify as liberal (39.4 percent),
conservative (44.8 percent) or moderate (14.4 percent). Results are unchanged if moderate leaners (a separate
question) are included as liberals or conservatives. Income is measured using an estimate of pre-tax household
income in thousands of dollars (mean=$114,858, median $55,000 sd=$423.54). Education is measured on a five point
scale with a mean of 3.41 (sd=1.15). Religiosity is measured with a four-point scale (0=“not religious at all”, 3=
“very religious”) with a mean of 1.97 (sd=0.83) Just over half the sample is female (51.1 percent)
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by a more diverse racial environment also seem to have an effect.
Table 4.2: Racial Diversity and Perceptions of Discrimination Against Blacks
Dependent variable:
Discrimination Against Blacks
All Lib Con
(1) (2) (3)
Diversity 0.075∗ −0.032 0.117∗
(0.035) (0.061) (0.049)
Education 0.263∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.090
(0.039) (0.069) (0.058)
Income 0.0005∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Female 0.270∗∗ 0.047 0.456∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.154) (0.129)
Religiosity −0.216∗∗∗ −0.199∗ −0.246∗∗
(0.053) (0.082) (0.082)
Conservative −0.881∗∗∗
(0.104)
Moderate −0.515∗∗∗
(0.140)
0|1 −3.351∗∗∗ −2.353∗∗∗ −3.015∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.382) (0.322)
1|2 −1.523∗∗∗ −0.622∗ −1.124∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.302) (0.289)
2|3 1.212∗∗∗ 2.016∗∗∗ 1.606∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.306) (0.292)
Observations 1,969 703 973
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 4.3: Racial Diversity and Trust in the Criminal Justice System
Dependent variable:
Trust in Police Trust in Legal System
All Lib Con All Lib Con
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diversity −0.204 −0.162∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.150∗ −0.152∗∗
(0.037) (0.062) (0.053) (0.035) (0.062) (0.049)
Discrimination −0.154 −0.321∗∗ −0.036 0.154∗ −0.029 0.094
(0.067) (0.118) (0.092) (0.065) (0.117) (0.087)
Education 0.200 0.081 0.374∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.093
(0.041) (0.071) (0.063) (0.039) (0.071) (0.057)
Income −0.00002 0.00002 −0.0001 −0.00001 0.00001 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Female −0.007 0.099 −0.117 −0.305∗∗∗ −0.267 −0.321∗
(0.094) (0.155) (0.136) (0.091) (0.155) (0.127)
Religiosity 0.311 0.295∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.189∗
(0.055) (0.081) (0.087) (0.053) (0.080) (0.083)
Conservative 0.452 0.223∗
(0.109) (0.102)
Moderate 0.608 0.041
(0.147) (0.141)
0|1 −2.990 −3.238∗∗∗ −3.434∗∗∗ −2.304∗∗∗ −2.197∗∗∗ −3.146∗∗∗
(0.281) (0.404) (0.462) (0.257) (0.402) (0.370)
1|2 −0.576 −1.226∗∗ −0.486 0.725∗∗ 0.861∗ 0.059
(0.246) (0.374) (0.348) (0.236) (0.374) (0.321)
2|3 2.535 1.813∗∗∗ 2.762∗∗∗ 3.586∗∗∗ 4.245∗∗∗ 2.707∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.378) (0.364) (0.253) (0.419) (0.336)
Observations 1,961 702 967 1,954 702 963
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
95
4.4.3 Study 3: Selective Exposure and Perceptions of Racial Fairness
The previous studies suggest that while perceptions of the relative racial fairness of the police are
driven in part by dispositional beliefs, they can also be shaped by experiences, both personal and
vicarious. The diverse information conveyed through vicarious experience seems to offer a path
toward finding common understanding of the issues faced by the criminal system in the U.S. Yet, if
dispositions shape both the incidence and consequence of such experiences, the results above may
be spurious. Following, Knox et al. (n.d.) and Gaines and Kuklinski (2011), I attempt to address
these concerns by incorporating selection into the design of a unique survey experiment, conducted
in two waves of the student subject pool of a large Midwestern university in the spring of 2016.
In the first wave, all respondents answered a baseline battery of questions about crime, including
the relative racial fairness questions used in the JWSS for a range of local government agencies
including the police. In the second wave, conducted several weeks later, respondents were first
randomly assigned to two branches of the experiment: one in which subjects are randomly assigned
to read vignettes about a person or people’s experiences with local government, and another in
which respondents were allowed to select the vignette they read based on the name of the person
involved. Specifically, respondents in the random- assignment arm of the survey were told they
were going to read about citizens’ experiences with local government that were either good or bad.
Then they were randomly assigned with equal probability to one of three treatment conditions.
Subjects in the control condition read a news story about a local family rescued from their home
by firefighters. In the remaining two conditions, respondents read about stereotype-consistent
experiences of either a black or white man with the police during a traffic stop.8 The vignettes are
patterned after the divergent experiences of white and black drivers described by Epp, Maynard-
Moody and Haider-Markel (2014). Both drivers in the vignette were ultimately given a ticket for
driving with a broken taillight. The white driver describes the experience as being relatively routine.
The officer is quick and courteous and the whole experience takes only 10 minutes. The black driver
describes a far more invasive and arduous experience, typical of the kind of “investigative stops”
Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2014) argue are far more common for black drivers. The
officer doesn’t tell the driver why he’s been pulled over, asks if he can search the car, calls for back
8Pictures of the drivers and full wordings of the treatment are provided in the appendix
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up that includes a canine unit. The whole thing takes close to half an hour, during which the black
driver sees his neighbors passing by.
In the second arm of the experiment, respondents were again told that they were going to
read about citizen’s experiences with local government, but first were asked whether they would
like to read about James or Jamal’s experience. Various discrimination studies find that people
make inferences about a person’s race based on their names (Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2004; Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2003). Choosing James (and not Jamal) provides an indication of a persons’
willingness to avoid experiences different from their own.
The outcome of interest is the difference between respondents’ perceived relative racial fairness
after treatment and their baseline reports. Since the treatments may influence both evaluations of
how the police treat Whites and Blacks, I examine the change in these components as well their
relative difference. Overall, I expect that respondents who read about the Black driver should
perceive Blacks to be treated less fairly by the police thus widening the overall gaps in how they
think the police treat Whites and Blacks. However, I expect the magnitude of this effect to vary by
respondents’ propensity to seek out or avoid information that may be in conflict with their prior
beliefs. To capture this propensity, I leverage the selection arm of the experiment to create a model
of how likely respondents are to select information about James (and avoid information about
Jamal), based on dispositional factors.9 From this model, I generate predictions for respondents
under random assignment to simulate how likely they would be to select into (or out of) the
information that they received. If exposure to such information leads to greater understanding
of systemic injustice, then the effects of reading about Jamal’s experiences should be largest for
respondents who are the least likely to be exposed to this information when given the opportunity
to choose. Alternatively, such people may deal with the dissonance created by such information
by reaffirming their prior beliefs (Kunda, 1990). When presented with evidence of racial profiling,
they may discount this experience and hold their prior beliefs more strongly.
Table 4.4 presents the results from the selection experiment designed to address these concerns.
The linear models show how respondents’ attitudes about the relative fairness of the police towards
Whites (column 1), Blacks (column 2), and the gap between Whites and Blacks (column 3) change
9Specifically, I model respondents’ choice using their Big-5 personality traits, ideology, partisanship and general
perceptions of how fairly police treat people. Results are presented in the Appendix.
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∆ Whites’ Treatment ∆ Blacks’ Treatment ∆ White-Black
(Intercept) −2.58 4.35 −6.92∗
(2.17) (2.35) (2.75)
Black Driver 2.44 −0.37 2.81
(3.21) (3.48) (4.06)
White Driver 0.70 −0.11 0.81
(3.03) (3.28) (3.84)
Select: Black Driver −0.88 −8.64∗ 7.76
(3.87) (4.19) (4.90)
Select: White Driver −8.09 8.99 −17.08∗
(6.76) (7.32) (8.56)
R2 0.02 0.04 0.04
Adj. R2 -0.01 0.02 0.02
Num. obs. 181 181 181
RMSE 15.67 16.98 19.84
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 4.4: Change in Perceptions of Relative Racial Fairness of the Police
in response to treatments that have been randomly assigned or selected by the respondent. Negative
coefficients for the first two columns indicate respondents felt that Whites (column 1) and Blacks
(column 2) were treated less fairly by the police after receiving or selecting treatment. Positive
coefficients in the third column indicate that perceive a greater gap in how fair Whites are treated
relative to Blacks.
If we had simply run this as a randomized experiment, it would appear that neither treatment
had much of an effect. Relative to the control, information about the Black or White driver’s
experience with the police has little effect on evaluations of the police’s treatment of Whites, Blacks
and the difference between the two groups. The responses under selection tell a different story. Here
we see that respondents who elected to read about Jamal’s experience (N=52), believe the police
treat the Blacks much less fairly after reading the vignette. Respondents who decided they wanted
to read about James’ experience (N=14) responded in a different fashion. After treatment, they
perceived smaller gaps in how Whites are treated relative to Blacks.
Figure 4.2 explores this heterogeneity further. Each row corresponds to the three outcomes
presented in Table 4.4: perceived change between baseline and post treatment evaluations of how
the police treat Whites (top row), Blacks (middle row) and the difference between Whites and Blacks
(bottom row). Within each row, each panel presents the results for each experimental condition in
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the random assignment arm of the experiment. The y-axis shows the outcome (perceived change),
and the x-axis shows the predicted probability that respondents in random assignment arm would
have selected to read about James’s experience rather than Jamal’s.10 The blue lines are fit using
a general additive model to detect flexible patterns of response.
We see from the top row that conditioning on this disposition to select or avoid information
about someone’s experiences with government based on their inferred race has little effect on how
citizens view the police’s treatment of Whites. However, these preferences appear to strongly
influence how they perceive the police’s treatment of Blacks, which in turn shapes their perceptions
of relative racial fairness. Specifically, looking at the third panel in the middle row, we see that
respondent’s who were randomly assigned to read about the experiences of a black driver during
the traffic stop respond very differently according to whether we think they would seek out or
avoid this information. Respondent’s who would have chosen to read about Jamal, encounter
information that is likely consistent with their prior beliefs of how Blacks are treated. As such,
they perceive Blacks to be treated far less fairly post treatment. In contrast, respondent’s who
seem likely to have avoided reading about Jamal and would have selected to read about James if
given the choice respond in an opposite fashion. When exposed to information about Black driver’s
negative experiences with the police, they actually think Blacks in general are treated more fairly
by the police. As the bottom right panel of Figure 4.2 shows, these different patterns of response
serve to polarize beliefs about the relative racial fairness of the police. While such polarization is
intriguing, these results must be interpreted with caution associated with small student samples
and hypothetical scenarios. The broader point is that by incorporating selection into the design of
an experiment we can detect heterogeneous responses that might have otherwise gone unnoticed,
and with regard to attitudes about the criminal justice system, there is every reason to believe such
heterogeneity will be the norm rather than the exception.
10These probabilities are generated by modeling respondent’s choice in the selection arm of the study as function
of their personality, ideology, partisanship, and baseline (pre-treatment) views of the general fairness of the police.
Full results are presented in the appendix. Probabilities have been centered and standardized.
99
Control White Driver Black Driver
−50
0
50
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Propensity to Select White Driver
∆ 
W
hi
te
 T
re
a
tm
en
t
Change in Police Treatment of Whites
Control White Driver Black Driver
−25
0
25
50
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Propensity to Select White Driver
∆ 
Bl
ac
k 
Tr
e
a
tm
en
t
Change in Police Treatment of Blacks
Control White Driver Black Driver
−60
−30
0
30
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Propensity to Select White Driver
∆ 
W
hi
te
−B
la
ck
 T
re
a
tm
en
t
Change in White−Black Police Treatment
Figure 4.2: The figure shows how changes in perceptions of how fairly police treat Whites (top),
Blacks (middle), and Whites relative to Blacks (bottom) in response to treatment vary condition-
ally on respondents’ expected likelihood of seeking out the information that treatment provides.
Exposure to information about Black person’s negative experiences with police appears to polarize
beliefs. People who may have avoided such information if given the choice, belief Blacks are treated
more fairly by the police after being randomly exposed to it, while people who may have thought
out this information believe Blacks are treated event more unfairly after reading the experimental
treatment.
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4.5 Conclusion
Whites and Blacks are often said to inhabit separate perceptual worlds with regard to justice
in America (Sigelman and Welsh, 1991; Hurwitz and Peﬄey, 2005a). Although there are ample
explanations for why these gaps exist, the factors that may cause them to widen or narrow are
less understood. If perceptions of injustice are relatively stable, then the prospects of finding a
consensus to address issues in the criminal justice system may be slim. If attitudes can be changed,
then the factors that cause them to change may be key to building a common ground for reform.
This chapter offers a simple framework for thinking about these questions in terms of expe-
riences, vicarious information, and dispositional beliefs. Considered separately, each factor helps
explain why gaps exist in perceptions of justice. When viewed collectively, this perspective high-
lights the inherent heterogeneity in how people respond to experiences and information about
injustice. The nature of that heterogeneity remains an open question. The observational analysis
suggests that exposure to diverse information about the criminal justice system can lead people to
recognize the potential of injustices in how different groups are treated particularly among those
disposed to think system is generally fair. Yet, the experimental results suggest exposure to such
information may polarize beliefs.
How do we reconcile these conflicting results? The most obvious answer is that information
conveyed in the experiment is different in kind from that measured in the observational studies.
Although the vignettes in the experiment were designed to convey experiences in an informal and
personal matter, reading these stories online during a survey is clearly different from the accumu-
lated experiences captured in the cross-sectional surveys. It may be easy to fit an experimental
vignette within one’s prior beliefs, whereas information conveyed from one’s personal experiences
or that of one’s friends and family likely has a different effect.
The outstanding questions and limitations of these studies present several avenues for future
research. Simply replicating the experimental design with a more representative sample is clearly
necessary before drawing broader conclusions. Perhaps even more fruitful would be a consideration
of how the medium shapes the messages. Survey experiments with vignettes or news stories may
have one effect while similar information conveyed through actual social interaction may yield a
different pattern of results, especially if researchers explicitly consider the potential for heterogenous
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responses that may arise from self-selection. A related question concerns the issue of change over
time. A single incident may have one effect, while repeated exposure has another. While more
costly, both observational and experimental data that contain multiple observations over time open
the door to number of important questions. Finally, while the data here have focused primarily on
Whites, clearly a consideration of minority perceptions is equaly important. Furthermore, it seems
likely that the factors that shape the opinions of relatively advantage groups in society may have
a different impact on more disadvanatged groups in society.
The broader fact remains that different people respond to information about injustice in different
ways. Recognizing and exploring this heterogeneity is an important step for future research. To
do so, scholars must recognize the way dispositions shape both the incidence and consequence of
experiences.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Overview
I began this dissertation with a discussion of Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson, MO. The circum-
stances of this shooting, I claimed are symptomatic of larger problems created by racial disparities
and inequality in the criminal justice system in the U.S. Specifically, I argued that these dispari-
ties created a vicious cycle whose political roots erected political barriers to change: Those most
affected by disparities in the criminal justice system are the least likely to participate, while those
relatively unaffected are often unlikely to recognize these disparities as an issue in need of political
solutions.
I address three components of this problem in Chapters Two, Three and Four, respectively,
In the first of these chapter, I examined the ways contact with the criminal justice system shapes
political behavior and contributes to participatory gaps between Whites and minorities. In the next
chapter, I considered how fairness beliefs and perceptions of injustice vary across race. Finally, I
considered the potential for attitudes and perceptions of injustice to change among Whites, showing
how this question is complicated by issues of self-selection. Below, I summarize the results of these
studies. I discuss the questions they raise for future research, and how these pieces fit together in
terms of the larger issues discussed above. Finally, I conclude by discussing the policy implications
of this work and the prospects for reform.
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5.2 Contact with the Criminal Justice System and Political Participation
Contact with the criminal justice system has political consequences. Identifying the effect of these
experiences is complicated by the fact that many of the socio-economic factors that predict increased
levels of contact also tend to be associated with decreased levels of political participation. Taking
advantage of the natural experiment created by the timing of offenses in relation to election day, the
results of Chapter Two show that turnout is consistently lower by about three to four percentage
points among people charged with a criminal offense in the days before an election compared to
those charged with an offense just after an election.
Exploring how the size of this effect varied based on characteristics of the individual, offense,
and context in which the offense occurred, the results of Chapter Two also spoke to the possible
mechanisms behind this effect. A portion of these results is clearly due to material factors. The
decrease in voting is larger among those more likely to vote: people who are older, have higher
incomes, and have voted in the previous elections. Similarly, the drop off in turnout increases with
the severity of the crime. These effects are largely similar among Whites and Blacks.
The chapter also finds evidence of potential psychological mechanisms posited by Lerman and
Weaver (2014) and others that may vary across race. Consistent with theories of policy feedback,
individuals charged with multiple offense vote at lower rates, and the effects of additional offenses
around an election are smaller than first offenses. Yet, when looking at the effect of repeated
traffic stops, a type of interaction often associated with racial profiling (Epp, Maynard-Moody and
Haider-Markel, 2014), the drop-off among Blacks is most evident among those for whom the event is
one of many repeated interactions with the police. Similarly, the decrease in voting for offenses that
were ultimately dismissed was nearly twice as large for Blacks than Whites. While the material
consequences of contact with the police may be similar across race, Blacks may bear an added
burden of psychological costs of experiences that carry a different meaning than the experiences of
Whites.
These results suggest several directions for further research. First, the findings of Chapter Two
speak primarily to the effects of contact with the criminal justice system on participation in a
specific election. Yet, these experiences likely have both immediate and long-term consequences.
Examining the way one experience influences both future encounters with the criminal justice
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system and subsequent political behavior can yield further insights into the various mechanisms at
play. It seems possible that immediate consequences of contact with the criminal justice system
on participation are driven primarily by the material costs whose effects are largely similar across
individuals. In contrast, the longer term repercussions of these events may arise from psychological
costs that differ across individuals and groups. If these more intangible costs are higher for Blacks
than for Whites, then a more focused comparison of Whites and Blacks charged with same offense
may find that initial decreases in turnout in the closest election carry over to participation in future
elections for Blacks but not for Whites.
Second, the analysis in Chapter Two has focused solely on the voting of individuals charged with
an offense. These people do not exist in isolation, and their experiences with the police and courts
may have consequences for the political behavior of those around them. Pairing court records to
measures of household turnout would allow scholars to explore the potential spillover effects of these
experiences. Again, the magnitude of these relationships is likely to vary based on characteristics
of the individual and the offense. A questionable traffic ticket may mean very different things to
someone’s spouse depending on the race of their partner and motivation attributed to the ticket.
Third, this analysis has focused primarily on turnout at the state level in Indiana. Future
research should explore potential contextual variation in the size of these relationships. The logic
of this design can easily be applied to other states where such data are available and variations
in the demographic and socio-economic makeup of these states may reinforce or revise the overall
pattern of results found here. Similarly, policing and justice are largely local affairs. Scholars
may leverage variation in how justice is administered within states and explore the consequences
of this heterogeneity. For example, the Department of Justice’s report on Ferguson found fines
and fees made up a significant portion of the city’s revenues. Such budgetary information may
provide an important indicator of how citizens relate to and view the criminal justice system in
their community.
The specific questions raised by this chapter also apply to the study of political participation
in general. Existing studies of the subject typically do one of two things: First, they identify
factors that predict differences in aggregate behavior. Thus, we know the rich tend to participate
more than the poor, the educated more than the uneducated, and the advantaged more than the
disadvantage (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Schlozman and Brady, 2012; Verba, Schlozman
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and Brady, 1995). A second set of studies identifies things that may “cause” behavior to change
among individuals, although again the results are reported in the aggregate (Gerber and Green,
2000; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). People who are contacted through get-out-the-vote efforts,
vote more, while people arrested by the police vote less.
Taken together, then, these studies tell us that large differences exist in the political partici-
pation of various groups in society, and that certain events and experiences seem to make people
more or less likely to participate. How we get from individual differences in behavior to aggre-
gate disparities in participation is a more complicated question. Within a potential outcomes
framework, causes are things that can vary (Holland, 1986). Characteristics like race, gender, and
socio-economic status are largely stable or slow moving. Their link to participation then must flow
through their association with things that do change. This relationship can be conceived of in
two ways. First individual characteristics are associated with the incidence of political experiences
and opportunities. The rich and well educated, are more likely to be targeted for mobilization by
campaigns (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). The range of politically relevant experiences extends
beyond the campaign; the poor and racial minorities are more likely to come into contact with the
criminal justice system, and as this and other studies have shown, these experiences are associated
with decreases in participation. Second, individual differences also condition the meaning people
give to these experiences and the way they respond to events (Holland, 2003). Some attempts
at mobilization are more effective among racial and ethnic minorities than others (Bedolla and
Michelson, 2012) and as Chapter Two showed, certain types of experiences with the police appear
to be particularly demobilizing for minorities.
Why these differences in meaning emerge requires us to step back and think about individuals
in a broader context. While limitations of data and design often lead us to focus on individuals at a
particular point in time, individuals do not exist in isolation. Consider two drivers, one white, one
black, who aside from race, are as similar as can be; they’re both men in their thirties who live in a
small Midwestern college town and drive silver Hyundai Elantras to work. One day while driving,
they’re pulled over by the same police officer during a click-it-or-ticket campaign, and given a ticket
for driving without wearing a seatbelt.
For the white driver, this may be his only interaction with the police all year. The costs of this
experience are likely to be primarily material. He will have to pay a fine and perhaps go to court.
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Perhaps his insurance will go up. Beyond that the consequences of this experience are likely to be
small, and political ramifications few.
Even though the circumstances and material costs of appear the same for the black driver, the
consequences of this experience may differ. Perhaps this is the second or third time this month
he has been stopped by the police. Even if it is his first encounter, he likely believes that Blacks
are stopped at higher rates by the police than Whites and believe his race (rather than or in
addition to his decision to wear a seatbelt) played a factor in being pulled over. This belief about
why the stop occurred changes the meaning and likely consequence of that experience. What was a
relatively mundane inconvenience for the white driver becomes evidence of larger social and political
inequality for the black driver.
In sum, experiences produce gaps in behavior because they occur at different rates for different
people. They can also lead to gaps because the they mean different things to different people. Both
dynamics are evident in the study of how contact with the criminal justice system shapes political
behavior. Racial disparities in the rates of and nature of contact contribute to participatory gaps
between Whites and racial and ethnic minorities. These gaps may be exacerbated by the fact
that disparities in the rate and nature of contact potentially lead people to ascribe very different
meanings to these events when seen in the broader context of both their personal and group
experiences with the criminal justice system. The remaining chapters of this dissertation explores
the consequences of the different meanings of justice across race and potential for change given
these constraints.
5.3 Perceptions of Justice in the U.S.
Evaluations of the criminal justice system differ markedly across racial and ethnic groups in the
U.S. Chapter Three of this dissertation provides further evidence of this divide as it pertains to the
perception of racial bias in policing. Chapter Four explores how these perceptions might change
among Whites.
Chapter Three illustrates a stark divide in who perceives racial bias during interactions with the
police. Across all racial and ethnic groups, there is variation in how fair people believe the criminal
justice system to be, both in general and in how it treats specific groups of people in the U.S. Using
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two survey experiments that hold the nature of experience with the police constant while varying
the race of the citizens involved, it finds considerable variation in how likely people of different racial
and ethnic backgrounds are to perceive racial inequality in the way police treat citizens. The first
experiment demonstrates that among Whites and Asians, fairness beliefs appear to be unrelated
to the likelihood of perceiving differences in police treatment of White and Black suspects. Among
Blacks and Hispanics, in contrast, these fairness beliefs strongly condition evaluations of how such
suspects are treated. The findings of the second experiment from this chapter also suggest that
these results may depend on how concepts are measured and the way situations are framed. In
less criminal settings where the class of suspects is held constant and the discretion of the police is
higher, Whites’ general beliefs about the fairness of the police do predict perceptions of differential
treatment.
Chapter Four explores the potential of Whites to perceive racial injustice and discrimination
further using both survey and experimental data. For each, it takes into account the potential for
personal experience and dispositional beliefs to condition the effect of exposure to the experiences
of Blacks and minorities. The observational analysis suggest such vicarious experiences increase
the likelihood that Whites recognize injustice and discrimination. These results are complicated
by concerns of self-selection. Measuring people’s propensity to seek out or avoid information about
the experience of Blacks, the chapter’s survey experiment finds that such information may produce
a polarizing effect. Specifically, among the subjects who were more likely to choose to hear about a
black rather than white person’s experiences with local government, hearing about a black person’s
negative encounter with the police during a traffic stop leads them to believe the police treat blacks
less fairly then whites. In contrast, people who seem likely to avoid this information appear to
respond in the exact opposite manner. Exposure to information about the experiences of a black
driver being racially profiled, leads them to say Blacks were actually treated more fairly by the
police–results potentially consistent with both general theories of motivated reasoning (Redlawsk,
2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Lodge and Taber, 2000) and specific findings about the link between
race and criminal justice policy (Peﬄey and Hurwitz, 2007)
Future research should recognize and explore these differences. First, the divergent findings of
Chapter Four suggest the medium through which information about racial disparities is conveyed
matters. The measures of such exposure in the observational data reflect personal and social
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interactions, while information conveyed in the survey experiment is more akin to the kinds of
impersonal information one might encounter in the media. It is possible that forces of motivated
reasoning are stronger in more impersonal settings. It is easier to counter-argue information from
strangers on the news. It is perhaps harder to dismiss the experiences of your friends, family, and
co-workers.
A related concern is the duration of these effects overtime. Framing effects typically diminish
over time (Chong and Druckman, 2010; Gerber et al., 2011). The observed effects in a survey
experiment may be short lived, while the effects of social interactions, even brief conversations,
may be more long lasting (Broockman and Kalla, 2016, e.g.).
Finally, much of the discussion in both chapters focuses largely on white perceptions of racial
injustice. Yet, as evident from the stop-and-search experiment, considerable variation exists in
how members of other racial and ethnic groups think about these issues. One particularly relevant
question to potential reforms of the criminal justice system is what factors lead members of groups
that suffer disproportionately worse outcomes to perceive the system more fairly?
For example, less then a year after Michael Brown was shot in Ferguson, Walter Scott, a 50-
year-old black male, was shot and killed by a police officer during a traffic stop in North Charleston
S.C.. Initial reports of the incident sound similar to Brown’s death in Ferguson. Scott had been
driving with a broken third taillight. At some point during questioning, Scott ran. The officer
fired his taser and claimed Scott had gotten hold of the weapon, at which point he fired his gun,
hitting Scott eight times in the the back.1 These initial reports would later be called into question
when a witness to events provide video contradicting many portions of the officer’s version and, in
particular, appearing to show the officer placing the taser Scott had allegedly stolen next to Scott
after he had been shot.
The reaction to Scott’s death differed markedly than Brown’s in Ferguson. Both liberals and
conservatives expressed outrage at the event.2 The officer involved in the shooting is currently
awaiting trial for murder in state court and also faces a federal charge for violating Scott’s civil
1See for example: Christina Elmore and David MacDougall “Man shot and killed by North Charleston police
officer after traffic stop; SLED investigating”, The Post and Courier 4 April, 2015, accessed online at http://www.
postandcourier.com/article/20150404/PC16/150409635 on July 4, 2016
2See for example Charles C.W. Cooke,“A Camera Will Mean Justice for Walter Scott” The Na-
tional Review 8 April 2015, available online at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/416645/
camera-will-mean-justice-walter-scott-charles-c-w-cooke
109
rights. The state legislature fast-tracked legislation and funding, named in Scott’s honor that would
require all officers to wear body cameras. Before Scott’s death, police in Charleston stopped nearly
200 drivers a day. After his death that number was cut in half.3 These are real changes that have
the potential to improve the quality of justice in South Carolina. Yet it remains an open question
how these changes will filter down into the beliefs and behavior of the citizens they’re intended
to benefit. Does knowing that you’re one of 100 instead 200 drivers stopped by the police that
day change your opinions about why the police stopped you in particular? Similarly, if the officer
who shot Scott is acquitted, will that wipe out any of the added trust gained from providing body
cameras to officers? The answers to these questions likely require us to think about how experiences
interact with beliefs and behavior
5.4 Moving Forward: The Link Between Experiences, Beliefs, Behavior, and
the Criminal Justice System
The links between experiences, beliefs, and behavior lie at the heart of many questions in political
science. They are also crucial to understanding the political challenges that face the criminal
justice system in the U.S. In short, experiences with the criminal justice system differ markedly by
race: For Whites they are relatively uncommon, and generally just. For minorities, and Blacks in
particular, contact is more common, more severe, and often less just. These disparate experiences
have direct consequences for political behavior and give rise to collective gaps in how members of
the these groups see the criminal justice system. These general beliefs in turn condition how people
see certain events and interpret their own experiences.
Disentangling these relationships is no easy task. It requires researchers to make decisions about
what is fixed and what may vary in their models. Sometimes these decisions are straightforward.
In most contexts, it may be reasonable to treat race as a relatively fixed attribute of an individual.4
Other times the decision is more complicated. Fairness beliefs, for example, are influenced in part
by things which are relatively stable like innate dispositions, or slow moving like socialization. As
3Andrew Knapp, “’Walter Scott effect’: North Charleston traffic stops cut in half after shooting, but is it the
lasting change critics seek?” 2 April, 2016
4The origins, meaning, and validity of that attribute are of course complicated (see for example Smedley and
Smedley, 2005)
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such, beliefs may condition the interpretation of events, but they are likely also to be shaped by
those experiences.
Broadly, the studies in this dissertation have proceeded from the view that differences that are
largely fixed within individuals–specifically, race and ideology–condition the effect of experiences
on beliefs and behavior as they relate to politics and the criminal justice system. They do so in
two ways: first, by conditioning the incidence of experience and second by conditioning the effects
of those experiences.
Minorities, and Blacks, in particular, are more likely to come into contact with the criminal
justice system and experience more severe outcomes from that contact. The political consequences
of these encounters are potentially further magnified by the different meaning Blacks and other
disadvantaged groups give to these experiences. Race conditions both the incidence and meaning
of events. The fact that Blacks and Hispanics are stopped more often by the police transforms any
one experience from a single, isolated event, to an encounter that is seen within the context of a
broader broader pattern of disparate treatment and inequality.
Addressing such disparities is complicated by the fact that Whites cannot personally experience
what it is like to stopped by the police simply because of the color of their skin. Instead, knowledge
of racial discrimination must come indirectly, either through the shared experiences of their peers
or broader public discussions of the issue. Here, too, individual differences condition both the
likelihood of encountering such information and the way it will be interpreted.
If the politics of race and the criminal justice system create barriers to change, they also suggest
paths to reform. Changes in the focus and enforcement of drug laws may reduce the practice of
investigative policing and pre-textual stops that contribute to racial disparities (Tonry, 1995; Epp,
Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel, 2014). Prison and sentencing reforms that lead to a renewed
focus on rehabilitation in place of deterrence and risk reduction can lessen the negative social and
democratic consequences of serving time (Weaver and Lerman, 2010). More broadly, any reduction
in the rates of contact with the police, courts, and prisons may not only increase participation, but
do so in a way that reduces participatory gaps between Whites and minorities. These added voices
may create constituency for reform that can help turn a vicious cycle of democratic withdrawal
into a virtuous cycle of political engagement.
The ability to create and sustain this constituency for reform depends both on how we talk
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about these issues and with whom we talk about them. Often it seems too easy to fit single events
or broad statistics within our prior understanding of the causes of crime and racial disparities in
criminal justice system.5 The growing use of dashboard and body cameras in police departments,
along with the efforts of organizations like Copwatch that encourage citizens to film interactions
with police, represent a possible corrective to this tendency. Indeed, in the days after two shootings
of black men by police in the summer of 2016, both of which were captured on video and shared
online, former Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich remarked in a public discussion:6
It took me a long time, and a number of people talking to me through the years to get
a sense of this. If you are a normal, white American, the truth is you dont understand
being black in America and you instinctively under-estimate the level of discrimination
and the level of additional risk. ... It’s more dangerous to be black in America. It’s both
more dangerous because of crime which is the Chicago story. But it is more dangerous
in that you’re substantially more likely to be in a situation where police don’t respect
you where you could easily get killed. I think sometimes for whites it’s difficult to
appreciate how real that is.
Gingrich’s remarks are notable for a number of reasons. First, their source suggests that chang-
ing beliefs about justice in America and finding a common ground that recognizes the need to
address racial disparities in policing, courts, and prisons is possible. Second, it illustrates just how
difficult that change may be. As Gingrich notes, it took years of talking to a number of people
before he reached his present beliefs. Understanding the situations in which those conversations
can occur and for whom they actually matter presents both a challenge for political scientist and
potential solution for policymakers looking to build a consensus for reform. Much has happened in
the wake of Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson, MO. While there are signs of progress, the recent
deaths of Philando Castile, and Alton Sterling serve as reminders of the work that remains to be
done.
5See for example Peﬄey and Hurwitz (2007) work on how Whites respond to evidence that death penalty dispro-
portionately effects Blacks.
6The full discussion is available on Gingrich’s Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/newtgingrich/videos/
10154285798134197/, accessed July 9, 2016.
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Appendix A: Supplemental Information
for Chapter 2
A.1 Robustness of Results to Different Bandwiths and Polynomial Orders
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Table A.1: LATE Estimates from Robustness Checks in Figure 7
Order Bandwidth LATE StndErr ll ul pval BIC
1.00 30 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 157697.88
2.00 30 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 157721.01
3.00 30 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 157735.50
4.00 30 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 157741.67
5.00 30 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.00 157753.13
6.00 30 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 157770.05
1.00 60 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 299548.36
2.00 60 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 299548.95
3.00 60 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 299570.13
4.00 60 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 299572.27
5.00 60 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 299591.31
6.00 60 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 299612.10
1.00 90 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 461250.42
2.00 90 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 461185.53
3.00 90 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 461209.82
4.00 90 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 461204.15
5.00 90 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 461214.84
6.00 90 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 461205.33
1.00 180 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 958272.44
2.00 180 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.32 958292.54
3.00 180 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 958176.42
4.00 180 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 958159.19
5.00 180 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 958127.35
6.00 180 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 958135.01
1.00 270 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 1444591.73
2.00 270 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.10 1444598.20
3.00 270 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.39 1444617.48
4.00 270 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 1444523.03
5.00 270 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00 1444435.24
6.00 270 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 1444440.92
1.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.97 1895583.23
2.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 1895363.66
3.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.30 1895332.17
4.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.95 1895336.72
5.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 1895025.86
6.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 1895013.15
Table A.2: Optimal Polynomial Order by Time Frame for Criminal Contact Models
Bandwidth LATE Order pval ll ul
30 0.03 1 0.00 0.03 0.03
60 0.02 1 0.00 0.02 0.02
90 0.03 2 0.00 0.02 0.03
180 0.04 5 0.00 0.03 0.04
270 0.04 5 0.00 0.03 0.05
365 0.04 6 0.00 0.02 0.05
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Figure A.1: LATEs for Traffic Cases
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Table A.3: LATE Estimates from Traffic Cases
Order Bandwidth LATE StndErr ll ul pval BIC
1.00 30 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 374712.39
2.00 30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 374721.75
3.00 30 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.57 374743.26
4.00 30 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 374759.28
5.00 30 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 374776.97
6.00 30 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 374795.01
1.00 60 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 678497.77
2.00 60 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 678501.54
3.00 60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 678503.68
4.00 60 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 678528.73
5.00 60 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 678540.55
6.00 60 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 678556.45
1.00 90 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 1044470.02
2.00 90 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 1044477.17
3.00 90 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 1044469.65
4.00 90 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 1044457.12
5.00 90 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 1044458.11
6.00 90 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 1044456.58
1.00 180 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 2280011.23
2.00 180 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 2279915.72
3.00 180 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 2279881.33
4.00 180 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 2279907.05
5.00 180 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 2279867.75
6.00 180 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.08 2279866.96
1.00 270 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.31 3549003.39
2.00 270 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 3548809.59
3.00 270 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.45 3548584.12
4.00 270 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 3548559.43
5.00 270 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 3548575.11
6.00 270 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 3548598.92
1.00 365 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 4588122.19
2.00 365 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 4587942.42
3.00 365 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 4587794.08
4.00 365 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.58 4587656.35
5.00 365 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.22 4587640.28
6.00 365 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 4587585.09
Table A.4: Optimal Polynomial Order by Time Frame for Traffic Contact Models
Bandwidth LATE Order pval ll ul
30 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
60 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
90 0.01 6.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
180 0.01 6.00 0.08 -0.00 0.02
270 0.01 4.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
365 0.02 6.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
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Figure A.2: LATEs for 2004
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Figure A.3: LATEs for 2006
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Figure A.4: LATEs for 2008
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Figure A.5: LATEs for 2010
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Figure A.6: LATEs for 2012
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Figure A.7: LATEs for 2014
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A.2 Window Selection for Randomization Inference
The figures below show the minimum p-values from a set of difference of means tests on a set of
covariates (age, income, white, and offense history) from the criminal data for windows of varying
length around. Figure A.8 shows the p-values from the unadjusted data and Figure A.9 shows the
p-values adjusting for a linear trend in the forcing variable. Figure A.10 shows a set of confidence
intervals for windows of varying length constructed by inverting a series of hypotheses tests for
constant effects of varying size using randomization inference (Rosenbaum, 2010). Again, contact
with the criminal justice system appears to reduce turnout by two to four percentage points.
Figure A.8: Window Selection for Criminal Data (Unadjusted)
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Figure A.9: Window Selection for Criminal Data (De-trended)
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Figure A.10: Sensitivity of Randomization Inference Estimates of Effects of Criminal Contact to
Window Size
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Appendix B: Supplemental Information
for Chapter 3
B.3 Survey Items from Justice in Washington State Survey
B.3.1 Experiment
In another incident, the police see two young [African-American/White] men about twenty years
old. They are walking very near a house where the police know drugs are being sold. The police
search the two men and arrest them for carrying drugs.
B.3.2 Outcomes
• How would you evaluate the police search? 0=Definitely NOT a reasonable search; 5=Defi-
nitely a reasonable search.
• Who are you more likely to believe in this case the police, who claim the two men were
carrying drugs, or the two men, who claim the police planted the drugs on them? 0=The two
men; 5=The police.
B.3.3 Police Fairness
• General Police Fairness: Based on what you have heard or your own experience how often
would you say the police generally treat all people with respect? About how often would
you say that the police make fair, impartial (unbiased) decisions in the cases they deal with?
(1=Never, 6=Always)
• Relative Police Fairness: How fairly or unfairly do you fee that each of the following
groups [Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Whites, randomized order] is treated by the justice system
in the U.S. (0=Very Unfairly, 100=Very Fairly)
B.3.4 Demographics
• Race: White, Black, Hispanic, or Asian
• Gender:0=Male, 1=Female
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• Education: What is the highest grade or level of education you have completed? 1=High
School or Less; 2=Some College; 3=College Graduate; 4=Post Graduate Degree
• Income: 1=Less than $10,000, 16=$500,000 or more
• Ideology: 1=Strong liberal, 5=Strong conservative
B.4 Survey Items from the Traffic Stop Experiment
B.4.1 Experiment
• Anthony, pictured below [White/Black], is an assistant professor at the university. Re- cently
while driving home from work, he was pulled over by the [local] police for [speed- ing/failing
to use a turn signal
B.4.2 Outcomes
• Here are some factors that might influence a police officer’s decision to pull someone over.
Please check all the factors that you think might have applied in Anthony’s case. (Age,
gender, race, type of car, age of car, neighborhood where driver was driving, other people
in driver’s car, music driver was listening too, driver’s clothes/physical appearance, driving
behavior)
• How likely do you think it was that Anthony broke the law (i.e. was engaged in the behavior
the police said was the reason they pulled him over)? (1=Very unlikely, 6=Very likely)
• How likely is that Anthony would win if he contested his ticket in court? (1=Very to somewhat
likely, 0=Very to somewhat unlikely)
B.4.3 Police Fairness
Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements (1=Strongly Dis-
agree; 5=Strongly Agree):
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• Police are concerned about respecting a citizens individual rights
• Police treat people as if they can be trusted to do the right thing
• Police treat people as if they only do the right thing when forced to
• The more expensive your car the more likely you are to get away with traffic violations
• Its not about what youve done, but who you are, and who you know, when it comes to the
police
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Appendix C: Supplemental Information
for Chapter 4
C.5 Survey Items from the Justice in Washington State Survey
C.5.1 Outcome
• Relative Racial Fairness: How fairly or unfairly do you fee that each of the following
groups [Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Whites] is treated by the justice system in the U.S. (0=Very
Unfairly, 100=Very Fairly). Difference between answer for Whites and Blacks.
C.5.2 Personal and Vicarious Experience with the Police
• Personal Negative Experience: Some people have had encounters with the police; others
have not. How many times have you ever: Felt you were treated disrespectfully by a police
officer? Felt you were treated unfairly by the police (0= Never, 1=1-2 times, 2=3-4 times,
3= 5-6 times, 4=7 + times, two items summed together)
• Network Items: Many people have friends, relatives, and other acquaintances who have
had encounters with the the justice system. These can be anything involving the police or
courts, such as calling the police for help, talking with the police after a a traffic accident,
being stopped by a police officer for questioning or a traffic violation, being placed under
arrest, going to court as a witness in a case, going to court to serve as a juror, or being a
party in a criminal or civil court proceeding. How many people do you know who have had
these kinds of encounters? [List up to three discussants for police and courts, separately]
– What is [his/her] race or ethnicity?
– Who was [his/her] experience with–the police, the courts or both?
– According to [name], overall, during this experience, the police/courts were 1= Very
unfair and disrespectful to 7 Very fair and respectful (recoded to run from -3 to 3)
C.5.3 Demographics
– Race: White, Black, Hispanic, or Asian
– Gender:0=Male, 1=Female
– Education: What is the highest grade or level of education you have completed?
1=High School or Less; 2=Some College; 3=College Graduate; 4=Post Graduate Degree
– Income: 1=Less than $10,000, 16=$500,000 or more
– Ideology: 1=Strong liberal, 5=Strong conservative
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C.6 Survey Items from the National Politics Survey
C.6.1 Outcomes
– Discrimination against Blacks: Do you think the following groups face a lot of
discrimination, some, a little, or no discrimination at all: African Americans? (0=None,
3=A Lot)
– Trust in Police:How much of the time do you think you can trust the following insti-
tution: the police? (0=Never, 3=Just About always)
– Trust in Legal System:How much of the time do you think you can trust the following
institution: the legal system? (0=Never, 3=Just About always)
C.6.2 Diversity
– Friends: How would you describe the ethnic mix of your group of friends? Would you
say mostly White, mostly Black, mostly Hispanic, mostly Asian, or mixed?
– Neighborhood: How would you describe the ethnic mix of your current neighborhood
(vecindario o barrio) where you live? Would you say mostly White, mostly Black, mostly
Hispanic, mostly Asian, or mixed?
– Workplace: How would you describe the ethnic mix of the place where you (work/last
worked)? Would you say mostly White, mostly black, mostly Hispanic, mostly Asian,
or mixed?
– Place of WorshipHow would you describe the ethnic mix of your place of worship?
Would you say mostly White, mostly black, mostly Hispanic, mostly Asian, or mixed?
C.6.3 Demographics
– Gender:0=Male, 1=Female
– Education: What is the highest grade or level of education you have completed?
1=High School or Less; 2=Some College; 3=College Graduate; 4=Post Graduate Degree
– Income: 1=Less than $10,000, 16=$500,000 or more
– Ideology: Liberal, Conservative or Moderate
– Religiosity: How religious would say you are-very religious, fairly religious, not too
religious, or not religious at all?
C.7 Survey Items from the Selection Experiment
C.7.1 Experiment
Black treatment (Jamal in selection condtion)
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I was driving home from work last week and
I looked up and there was a cop behind me.
I was being extra careful about stuff like sig-
naling and coming to a full stop, but when I
turned onto my street, he turned on his lights
and pulled me over.
I took out my license and when he came up to
the window, he asked me where I was going. I
told him I was driving home and he just kind
of smirked, took my license and said he’d be
right back. I waited in the car for about 10
minutes and when the cop came back he asked
if they could take a look inside my car. I said
I’d rather not and he said fine, but he had to
run to some paperwork since my car matched
the description for a complaint they had.
Five minutes later two more cars pulled up.
One of them had a canine unit. The dog
walked around my car for a bit, then the of-
ficers were talking. I saw my neighbors drive
by which was really embarrassing. Finally af-
ter like half an hour the officer comes back,
hands me a ticket for a broken tail light and
tells me to have a nice day.
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White treatment (James in selection condition):
I was driving home from work last week, and
I looked up and there was a cop behind me.
I was being extra careful about stuff like sig-
naling and coming to a full stop, but when I
turned onto my street, he turned on his lights
and pulled me over.
I took out my license and when he came up
to the window, he asked me if I knew my tail
light was broken. Of course, I didn’t until he
told me.
I was kind of worried, but he just took my
license and said he’d be right back. A few
minutes later, he came back with a warn-
ing ticket and told me to have a nice day
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Control treatment: (Randomization only)
{CITY} A fire apparently started by improperly disposed charcoal has displaced a family
from its {local} rental home.
{Local} firefighters were called to {address} at 3:14 a.m. Wednesday where they found flames
coming out the roof of the single-story home.
Deputy Fire Marshal said the couple living there with their infant had grilled out. About
7:30 p.m. on Tuesday, the husband dumped charcoal briquettes into a plastic bucket outside
the sliding glass door at the rear of the home.
Hours later, the couple was awakened by their smoke detector and got out safely with their
baby and one cat. Firefighters rescued a second cat.
“The fire started on the outside and progressed up into the attic. Most of the body of the
fire was in the attic when we arrived,” said {Fire Marshall}. Flames broke through the roof,
he said, but firefighters had the fire under control within about 12 minutes of arriving.
Fire damage was mostly contained to the attic and roof but there was smoke damage inside.
The damage, which he estimated at $30,000, was enough to displace the family. Smith de-
clined to name the occupants but said the house is owned by local realtor.
{Fire Marshall}recommends leaving charcoal inside the grill to cool thoroughly before dis-
posing of it. And, when tossing the charcoal, make sure you put it in a metal container.
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C.7.2 Outcomes
– Relative Racial Fairness What percent of the time do you think each of the insti-
tutions below [The police, courts, firefighters, local schools, the DMV] treats [Asians,
Blacks, Hispanics/Latinos, Whites]fairly (0=Never, 100=Always). Final outcome is a
difference in difference: White-Black difference for police post treatment minus White-
Black difference for police pre-treatment.
C.7.3 Pre-treatment covariates
– Personality Traits: On this page, you will answer a series of questions related to your
personality. For example, the next question contains pairs of words people sometimes
use to describe themselves. For each pair of words, we would like you to indicate on
a scale of zero to ten which word best describes you. For example, in the first row
the number zero means “unimaginative,” the number 10 means “imaginative,” and the
number 5 is exactly the middle, neither unimaginative nor imaginative.
∗ Openness: Unimaginative — Imaginative; Uninquisitive — Curious; Philosophical
— Practical (reversed)
∗ Conscientiousness: Reliable — Unreliable (reversed); Sloppy — Neat; Careless
— Careful
∗ Extroversion: Reserved — Outgoing; Talkative — Quiet (reversed); Bold — Shy
(reversed)
∗ Agreeableness: Uncooperative — Cooperative; Kind — Unkind (reversed); Cold
— Warm
∗ Emotional Stablity: Steady — Moody (reversed); Relaxed — Nervous (reversed);
Tense — Calm
– Partisanship: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... (1=Strong Democrat,
7=Strong Republican)
– Ideology: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is
a seven- point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged
from very liberal to very conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
(1=Very liberal 7=Very conservative)
– Police Fairness: Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following
statements (1=Strongly Disagree; 5=Strongly Agree):
∗ Police are concerned about respecting a citizens individual rights
∗ Police treat people as if they can be trusted to do the right thing
∗ Police treat people as if they only do the right thing when forced to
∗ The more expensive your car the more likely you are to get away with traffic viola-
tions
∗ Its not about what youve done, but who you are, and who you know, when it comes
to the police
C.7.4 Selection Model
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Model 1
(Intercept) −2.28
(17.88)
Openness −1.15
(1.59)
Conscientiousness −2.60
(2.56)
Agreeableness 2.23
(2.78)
Extraversion 1.29
(1.19)
Emotional Stability −0.44
(0.63)
Ideology 1.72
(2.61)
Republican 7.53
(5.04)
General Police Fairness −0.08
(0.07)
AIC 28.52
BIC 40.83
Log Likelihood -5.26
Deviance 10.52
Num. obs. 29
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table C.1: Selection Model
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